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Is it possible for the victim of epistemic injustice to be appreciative of it? What we get from the literature 
is that victims of epistemic injustice are either unaware of, indifferent to, or resistant against, the injustices 
that they experience – never appreciative. But how should we understand instances where the victims of 
epistemic injustice are also victims of historical systems of self-devaluation that make them perversely 
appreciative of the harms they face? (Colonisation, for instance.) In this dissertation, I argue for a new 
form of epistemic injustice that makes sense of instances like this. I tag it hegemonic injustice. This is a 
form of epistemic injustice that tracks the use of pervasive markers of credibility that have become 
hegemonic to the mind of the oppressed. It has the unique attribute where victims of these epistemic 
injustices become accomplices to their oppression in a process I call appreciative silencing. This is a form 
of epistemic silencing where a) the perpetrator and victim rely on ill-formed hegemonic intuitions, b) the 
victim is neither resistant to the oppression they experience, nor do they recognise it as such, c) the victim 
appreciates the oppressive system.  
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‘All men[sic] by nature desire to know’ (Aristotle 1981: 1). This claim by Aristotle bears witness to the 
centrality of knowledge to being human. Epistemology, as one of the core branches of philosophy, 
inquires into issues that permeate every other branch of philosophy, the natural sciences, the human 
sciences, and life in general. This unique role of epistemology points to the vital importance of knowledge. 
Epistemologists have been concerned with answering a range of questions about knowledge, but four 
questions represent the core enquiry of epistemology. These are about the nature of knowledge (what is 
knowledge?), the sources of knowledge (how do we know?), the limits of knowledge (what can we 
know?), and the legitimacy of knowledge (do we know?).  
Various attempts to answer these questions have shaped debates in epistemology (Gettier 1963, Descartes 
1641, Locke 1860, Schlick 1934, Zagzebski 1994, among others). This effort by epistemologists is what 
we can call the analytical project. It is mainly an attempt by epistemologists trying to come up with an 
adequate definition of knowledge that is ‘informative, noncircular, and which could suitably 
accommodate our salient epistemological intuitions’ (Pritchard 2012: 247). While the accounts that have 
been provided by different philosophers vary, one salient feature that remained more or less the same 
for the longest time is the general idea that when we talk about knowledge, the doxastic attitudes of the 
individual agent take centre stage. Call this individual epistemology. 
Contra this idea of individual epistemology, the relatively new and growing field of social epistemology was 
formed. ‘Social epistemology proceeds on the commonsensical idea that information can often be 
acquired from others’ (Goldman and O’Connor 2019). It is concerned with the role others, and our social 
situatedness play in our acquisition of knowledge. This move changes the narrative from ‘knowledge per 
se’ to ‘situated knowledge’. The concept of situated knowledge was introduced to the lexicon of social 
epistemology by Donna Haraway (1988). This is simply a way to understand knowledge and knowers as 
arising from a particular social milieu, and acknowledging the influence that this might have on knowledge 
formation. This introduced a pragmatic dimension to the field of epistemology. It gave new meanings to 
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traditional questions like ‘how do we know?’ The concern is not simply about the ‘evidence’ we have for 
what we know but with how social factors influence what we know.  
These pragmatic considerations of social epistemology, coupled with the intuitions of virtue 
epistemology1 are, in many ways, foundational to the relatively new field of epistemic injustice (if we take 
Miranda Fricker’s seminal work in 2007 to be the catalyst for this field). According to Fricker (2007: 1), 
epistemic injustice occurs when a person is harmed in their capacity as a knower due to prejudicial 
stereotypes held against them. Fricker identifies two forms of this injustice - ‘testimonial injustice’ and 
‘hermeneutical injustice’. Testimonial injustice occurs when this harm to the knower is due to a credibility 
deficit. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when this harm is due to a lack of hermeneutical resources caused 
by hermeneutical marginalisation (ibid).  
Many varieties of epistemic injustice have since been proposed, that either expand on or point out a 
different phenomenon from Fricker’s initial two. These include, but are not limited to ‘wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance’ (Pohlhaus 2012), ‘contributory injustice’, (Dotson 2012), ‘interpretative 
injustice’ (Peet 2017), ‘epistemic trust injustice’ (Grasswick 2018), ‘affective injustice’ (Srinivasan 2018), 
et cetera. Without going into detail on the nuanced differences between these forms of epistemic injustice, 
what is noteworthy at this point is that just as with Fricker’s varieties, these forms of epistemic injustice 
aim to identify instances where an epistemic agent is treated unjustly as a knower due to prejudicial 
stereotypes against them. Cognate phenomena like ‘epistemic violence’ (Dotson 2011), ‘epistemic 
oppression’ (Dotson 2014), and ‘epistemic exploitation’ (Berenstain 2016) have also been theorised to 
 
1 Ernest Sosa’s (1980) attempt at adjudicating between the foundationalists and the coherentists accounts of 
epistemic justification represents one of the more prominent uses of the notion of intellectual virtue in 
contemporary epistemology. This trajectory of understanding knowledge has come to stay under the growing field 
of ‘Virtue Epistemology’. In virtue epistemology, the focus is on the epistemic agent and the intellectual virtues 
and vices they utilise in their epistemic lives. This is in contrast to the traditional belief-based epistemology where 
the central foci where on beliefs, truth, and justification. 
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varying degrees. One theme that is salient to these forms of epistemic bad practices is that an epistemic 
agent is harmed in their capacity as a knower. What is the nature of this harm? 
Fricker (2007: 43) notes a purely epistemic harm that might arise from instances of testimonial injustice. 
That harm is that ‘knowledge that would be passed on to a hearer is not received’. The speaker is 
prevented ‘from successfully putting knowledge into the public domain’ (ibid). Fricker sees this as an 
‘unfreedom of our collective speech situation’ (ibid). Andrew Peet (2017: 3425) understands cases of 
interpretative injustice to be cases of silencing, ‘since if one misinterprets the content of an utterance then 
one thereby fails to recognise the illocutionary act being performed, or the speaker’s communicative 
intention’. For Fricker and Peet, the harm of testimonial and interpretative injustices respectively is that 
they prevent an epistemic agent from communicating effectively. That is, an agent’s utterance fails to get 
the desired uptake. This is one factor that causes the gap in the knowledge economy that is responsible 
for other strands of epistemic injustice (hermeneutical injustice, contributory injustice, wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance). When an epistemic agent’s testimony or utterance fails to get the desired 
uptake, or when an agent is unsuccessful in putting knowledge into the public domain due to 
insufficiencies in the collective hermeneutical resources, that epistemic agent is silenced. 
The literature on epistemic silencing is as vast as it is nuanced (Langton 1993, Hornsby 1995, Hornsby 
and Langton 1998, Maitra 2009, Fricker 2007, Dotson 2011, Pohlhaus 2014). Without going into the 
intricacies, here is a theme that is salient to the various accounts of epistemic silencing: an epistemic 
agent’s speech condition is impaired by a lack of uptake on the part of the hearer. In all these instances 
of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, epistemic oppression, and the resultant silencing, the emotions 
felt by the victims almost certainly involve anger. This is a legitimate response to injustice (Bailey 2018). 
The angry reaction of the victim of these epistemic bad practices is a way for us to recognise and track 
instances of these epistemic bad practices. This claim is either explicitly stated or implied in the literature 
on epistemic injustice and its cognate phenomena.  
4 
 
But how should we understand instances where the victims of these epistemic bad practices are also 
victims of historical systems of self-devaluation that make them perversely appreciative of the harms they 
face? Let me make the core intuition of this question clearer with an example. 
The Grateful Graduate: Peter obtained a PhD from a prestigious Western university. When 
asked in an interview what he attributes his success to, Peter talks about his childhood growing 
up in Nigeria. For Peter, the reason for his success is that as a child in Nigeria, he went to schools 
where he was taught ‘correctly’ (a Western curriculum) and taught to speak the ‘proper way’ 
(English), and was scolded when he spoke in his home language (Urhobo) which is considered 
to be ‘vernacular’, and ‘uncivilised’. 
In this instance, Peter is appreciative of the colonial system that has been unjust to him. Rather than 
show the expected angry reaction to the epistemic injustice he has experienced, he shows appreciation. 
In this dissertation, I argue for a new form of epistemic injustice that makes sense of instances like this. 
I tag it hegemonic injustice. This is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when the oppressed in a given 
system accept the ill-formed hegemonic intuitions that oppress them. By ill-formed hegemonic intuitions, 
I mean those in-built standards of validation with which we judge what is properly epistemic within an 
epistemic system that is influenced by prejudicial stereotypes. In the case of Peter above, the ill-formed 
hegemonic intuition is the intuition that the English language in particular, and Western paradigms, in 
general, are superior to the ones indigenous to Peter and his folks. The prejudicial stereotypes that are 
foundational to this hegemonic intuition are the well documented prejudicial stereotypes that 
accompanied colonialism (Ngugi 1986, Tobi 2020, Wiredu 2002, Ypi 2013). 
The distinguishing mark of Hegemonic injustice is that its victims become accomplices to their 
oppression in a process I call appreciative silencing. This is a form of epistemic silencing where  
a) the perpetrator and victim rely on ill-formed hegemonic intuitions,  
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b) the victim is neither resistant to the oppression they experience, nor do they recognise it as 
such,  
 c) the victim appreciates the oppressive system.  
Before outlining how I proceed to make my argument, some central clarifications are important. First, 
two colloquially similar terms that I use a lot in the course of this dissertation are ‘wrong’ and ‘harm’. I 
do not imply this similarity in any of my usage. Rather, I use each term deliberately to refer to a distinct 
phenomenon. I use ‘wrong’ in reference to the ethical value of a phenomenon. It is not necessarily in 
reference to an action, and definitely not in reference to the consequence of an action. For example, if a 
person sits in the middle of the desert and thinks racist or sexist thoughts to themselves, they are 
wronging the subjects of those thoughts even though they do not and cannot ever harm these subjects2. 
The content of the thoughts is racist and sexist. If this person says these racist and sexist thoughts to the 
subject, in addition to the wrongness of these thoughts, they are now actively harming the subject with 
their thoughts. My use of ‘harm’, therefore, is in reference to the consequences of wrong thoughts and 
actions. So, the varieties of epistemic injustice I consider here are wrongs in themselves, but it is not 
always the case that they harm someone. Whenever I use ‘wrong’ and ‘harm’ here, I have this distinction 
in mind. 
Second, most of my examples of hegemonic injustice or appreciative silencing are colonial examples. I 
must state upfront that I do not consider my analysis of these phenomena to be limited to cases of 
colonisation. It is also applicable to other cases of systemic oppression like patriarchy, sexism, 
heteronormativity, et cetera. What ties these sorts of cases together is that they are historical and continual 
systems of oppression where the victims could internalise the intuitions that are primary to their 
oppression. My decision to use mainly colonial examples is simply due to their intellectual proximity to 
me.  
 
2 Thanks to Veli for this example. 
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I proceed as follows. In Chapter 1, I aim to lay the groundwork for my dissertation by situating myself 
within the relevant literature and pinning down the intuition that motivates my overarching argument. I 
use this chapter to highlight the relevant pieces of literature to my research that I will refer to often. I 
start by giving an overview of the debates on epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and epistemic 
oppression. The overview I provide here is by no means exhaustive of the growing literature in this area. 
What I aim to do is clarify some of the concepts from the literature that I will refer to often. In some 
cases, I employ these concepts as they are. In cases where I do not, I clarify my usage of the concept. I 
conclude this chapter by arguing for silencing as a central harm of the epistemic bad practices I highlight. 
Chapter 2 starts by unpacking some of the nuanced conceptions of silencing in the literature. One thing 
they have in common is that an agent is silenced when they fail in their intended communicative act and 
this elicits a response of anger from its victim. This is an appropriate response to the injustice that a 
silenced person faces. Like I have stated (and hope to root firmly in this chapter), anger is a central 
element in instances of epistemic injustice that involves silencing. Having established this, I establish the 
counterintuition that in some cases where someone is a victim of epistemic injustice, this emotional 
response of anger is not present. Rather, we see the victims being appreciative of the harm they face. 
This leads me to my central argument in this chapter. I argue for the phenomenon of appreciative 
silencing. I theorise appreciative silencing with the aid of an analogy. A crucial facet of appreciative 
silencing, I argue, is that it is possible due to a) similar hegemonic intuitions that the victims and 
perpetrators of appreciative silencing share and b) a foundational epistemic problem. 
In chapter 3, I argue for a new form of epistemic injustice that makes sense of instances where 
appreciative silencing occurs. I tag it hegemonic injustice. This is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs 
when the oppressed in a given system accept the ill-formed intuitions that oppress them. It has a unique 
attribute where victims of epistemic injustice become accomplices to their oppression. With most of the 
existing forms of epistemic injustice, the focus has been on how social injustices have an epistemic 
dimension. Broadly construed, hegemonic injustice has the same focus. However, the particular focus of 
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hegemonic injustice is on how hegemonic intuitions lead to hegemonic injustice – a distinct form of 
epistemic injustice that can be tracked through the phenomenon of appreciative silencing. 
In the final chapter, I aim to provide further clarity on the key features of hegemonic injustice. I start by 
arguing that it is a third-order phenomenon, after Dotson’s (2014) notion of third-order epistemic 
exclusion. Taking the key features of such exclusion to be fundamental to third-order phenomena, I show 
how hegemonic injustice is similar to these features in some instances. And argue for how hegemonic 
injustice deviates from Dotson’s characterisation of these features in other instances. I end with a 




‘In a situation of oppression, epistemic relations are screwed up’ (Medina 2013: 27). 
1.1. The Social Nature of Knowledge  
Knowledge, one of the central cognitive successes in epistemology, has long been understood in 
individualistic terms. What is important when we understand knowledge in this way are the doxastic 
attitudes of the individual. Even in instances where epistemic properties are not taken to be necessary 
and sufficient for knowledge, the focus is still on the knowing individual. This extends to knowledge 
communities. So, when a scientific community claims to know that P, the focus is on the justification 
that they have for that belief, and the truth of the belief.  
While this traditional view on knowledge has taken the doxastic attitude of the knower into account, one 
aspect of the knower that it has vastly neglected is her social situatedness. This gap in epistemology gave 
rise to the relatively new field of social epistemology, and earlier movements that are analogous to what 
we understand social epistemology to be today (Foucault 1969, Kuhn 1962, Latour and Woolgar 1986, 
Rorty 1979). 
Social epistemology, in contradistinction to individualistic epistemology, is concerned with the role others 
and our social situatedness play in our acquisition of knowledge. This move changes the narrative from 
‘knowledge per se’ to ‘situated knowledge’. This merging of social considerations with epistemic 
considerations inevitably means that epistemic issues are bound to become social issues. One such issue 
is that of privilege and underprivilege in society and how this leads to concerns of injustice. Transposing 
this issue to epistemology, the growing field of epistemic injustice came about.  
This chapter lays the groundwork for my dissertation by situating my proposal within the relevant 
literature and pinning down the intuition that motivates my overarching argument. 
I start in section 1.1 by giving an overview of the debates on epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and 
epistemic oppression. The overview I provide here is by no means exhaustive of the growing literature 
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in this area. What I aim to do with this section is to clarify some of the concepts from the literature to 
which I will refer often. In some cases, I employ these concepts as they are. In cases where I do not, I 
clarify my usage of the concept. In giving this overview, I also show the intuition that is central to my 
overarching argument. This is the intuition that someone can be a victim of epistemic injustice, epistemic 
violence, or epistemic oppression and not act in the way that we have come to expect from the literature.  
I conclude this chapter in section 1.2 by arguing for silencing as a central harm of the epistemic bad 
practices I highlight in section 1.1. My claim in the final section of this chapter should not be understood 
as the claim that silencing is the central harm of these epistemic bad practices. Neither should it be 
understood as the claim that silencing is the worst possible harm that can arise from these epistemic bad 
practices. It is possible to imagine worse harms like the loss of life due to testimonial injustice that a 
subject suffers in a courtroom leading to a false conviction. My claim should, rather, be understood as 
an argument for silencing as a salient harm that cuts across these epistemic bad practices and is more 
detrimental to the knowledge economy, since, when someone is silenced, knowledge that would have 
been shared is lost. 
1.2. Epistemic Injustice, Violence, and Oppression 
In this section, I give an overview of the debates on epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and epistemic 
oppression. I do this to isolate their salient feature: they lead to epistemic harms; and these epistemic 
harms, at the very least, are embodied in various forms of silencing. These range from cases where an 
agent is prevented from speaking at all to cases where they speak, but their speech act does not get the 
desired uptake. I say more about this in the next chapter. In the meantime, it is worth noting that even 
though silencing, the way I investigate it here, is an effect of either epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, 
or epistemic oppression, it is still possible to conceive of silencing as the cause of these epistemic bad 
practices. Silencing comes as the effect at the preliminary stage when these epistemic bad practices occur, 
but once these acts of silencing have been ingrained, they become conduits that enable furtherance of 
these epistemic bad practices. Again, this point will be made clearer in the next chapter. For now, I aim 
to show that these various forms of epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, and epistemic violence 
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generate many harmful consequences. They range from the gap created in the knowledge economy 
(which creates ignorance) to the silencing of the victims of this epistemic injustices/violence. There are 
various ways to see how these harmful consequences can affect every member of an epistemic 
community. However, the focus of this dissertation is on how it silences them. I elaborate more on this 
point in the next chapter. In the meantime, let me go through these forms of epistemic injustice, violence, 
and oppression. 
1.2.1. Epistemic Injustice 
Epistemic injustice happens when an agent is wronged in their capacity as a knower – either as a source 
of knowledge or as a recipient of knowledge (Fricker 2007: 20). The central case of epistemic injustice is 
that this wrong is a result of prejudicial stereotypes held against the agent or members of the agent’s 
social group. For instance, if my testimony that I was unlawfully harassed by the police is not given the 
credibility it deserves because I am black and black people are (wrongly) ‘known’ to exaggerate or lie 
about instances of police violence, it is an instance of epistemic injustice. This wrong ‘knowledge’ about 
black people amounts to a prejudicial stereotype that guides the amount of credibility I am given as an 
epistemic agent.  
But what guides credibility judgements? Sanford Goldberg (2013, 2015) argues for at least four elements 
that inform our credibility judgements. These are information about the speaker’s track record of saying 
true things, the speaker’s demeanour (confident or not), the hearer’s background knowledge about the 
topic, and the reputation of the speaker’s sources. To this list, I add elements like the speaker’s accent 
and the speaker’s social group (gender, race, sexuality, social class, et cetera.). To the extent that these 
elements negatively affect the credibility we give to a speaker’s testimony, it is an instance of ‘testimonial 
injustice’ (Fricker 2007).  
This is just one of the many possible epistemic injustices an agent can face due to prejudicial stereotypes. 
Another form related to the agent’s testimony is ‘interpretative injustice’ argued for by Peet (2017). 
According to Peet, the same prejudicial stereotypes that lead to testimonial injustice can lead to the false 
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interpretation of an agent’s utterances more generally. For example, suppose I say ‘the police are not 
doing a proper job’ and I am interpreted as meaning ‘I will disregard the authority of the police’ because 
I am black and black people are ‘known’ to be anti-police. This is different from cases of testimonial 
injustice because, with testimonial injustice, it is an issue of credibility deficit regarding my testimony. 
With interpretative injustice, by contrasts, the focus is first, on my utterances (not just testimonies) more 
generally, and secondly, I am given some credibility as an agent but what I say is interpreted in ways that 
I do not intend, due to prejudicial stereotypes held against me. Hence, my utterance fails to get the desired 
uptake. 
While these two forms of epistemic injustice have to do with speech acts broadly construed, other forms 
have to do with the epistemic resources available to members of marginalised groups and how the 
resources that come from these groups are treated. Suppose, for instance, that I am treated strangely by 
the police; I notice this treatment to be peculiar to members of my racial group, and I know something 
is wrong with this kind of treatment but cannot say what is wrong because I lack the linguistic resources 
to do so. This is an instance of ‘hermeneutical injustice’. Fricker (2007) uses hermeneutical injustice to 
refer to instances where members of socially marginalised groups lack the epistemic resources to make 
sense of their experiences. This whole process is caused by epistemic marginalisation. 
The purview of epistemic injustice is further increased by connecting it with the epistemology of 
ignorance. That is, the idea that those who are privileged in society also have an epistemic privilege and 
this privilege leads to credibility excess and other related cognitive benefits. Rather than being a positive 
thing, this becomes negative insofar as members of these privileged groups are arrogant in their 
possession of these cognitive benefits. This is because it leads to them being closed-minded in their 
epistemic lives and they thus, become breeding grounds for ignorance rather than knowledge. This 
process is what Jose Medina (2013: 27) refers to as ‘active ignorance’.  
Another wrong of this credibility excess that members of socially dominant groups enjoy is that it usually 
goes with the credibility deficit that members of socially marginalised groups suffer. Although Fricker 
(2007: 19-20) argues that this way of understanding the credibility economy is wrong since credibility is 
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not a limited resource, I support Medina’s (2011: 20) qualified objection to her. Medina agrees that 
credibility is not a limited resource that can be depleted but argues that the credibility excess that members 
of socially dominant group enjoy typically translates into a disproportionate credibility deficit for members 
of socially marginalised groups. I say more on this in the fourth chapter of my dissertation where it 
becomes relevant. In the meantime, the important point from the epistemology of ignorance is the 
creation of ‘active ignorance’ by members of socially dominant groups and how this ‘active ignorance’ 
gains traction due to the credibility excess possessed by members of these socially dominant groups. 
Connecting the epistemology of ignorance to epistemic injustice and pushing my above scenario further, 
suppose that I report that I have been brutalised by the police. If my testimony is still being deliberately 
obscured from the collective social understanding by members of the dominant social groups, it is an 
instance of ‘willful hermeneutical ignorance’ (Pohlhaus 2012). Gaile Pohlhaus argues that ‘willful 
hermeneutical ignorance’ is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when dominantly situated knowers 
disregard the epistemic tools of the marginally situated knowers. This allows the ‘dominantly situated 
knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world’ of the marginally 
situated knower (Pohlhaus 2012: 715). 
This sentiment on the connection between epistemic injustice and the epistemology of ignorance is 
echoed by Kristie Dotson (2012) in her concept of ‘contributory injustice’. Dotson (2012: 31) defines 
contributory injustice as a form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance that maintains and utilises structurally 
prejudiced hermeneutical resources to harm the epistemic agency of a knower due to ‘situated ignorance’. 
Situated ignorance, here, refers to a kind of ignorance that is an offshoot of one’s social situatedness, 
insofar as this social situatedness fosters close-mindedness to other epistemic and social realities.                
So, in the same way that knowledge can be influenced by social situatedness, ignorance can also be 
influenced by social situatedness. What Dotson shows here is that the situated ignorance of one group 
makes it possible for them to ignore whole parts of the world that they do not find relevant. This leads 
to the formation of prejudiced hermeneutical resources.   
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When a group of people have been victims to these sorts of epistemic injustices over time, they develop 
distrust towards those who have perpetrated these injustices on them. This is, intuitively, justifiable since 
to the mind of these socially marginalised, the socially dominant groups do not have their best interests 
at heart. So, members of socially marginalised groups not only distrust claims to knowledge that arise 
from members of the socially dominant groups, but they also fail to participate in those kinds of 
knowledge formation practice. Now, in the case that this refusal to participate obstructs the epistemic 
bad practices of the socially dominant groups, the distrust exhibited by the socially marginalised is an 
epistemic virtue. But what happens when this distrust extends to cases where participating in these 
epistemic activities might actually be beneficial to members of the socially marginalised groups?  
While it might, intuitively, seem like an epistemic vice on the part of the socially marginalised, Heidi 
Grasswick (2018) explains instances like this as cases of ‘epistemic trust injustice’. This is a form of 
epistemic injustice which occurs when a community or agent (usually the dominantly situated) fails to 
‘satisfy the conditions of responsibly-placed trust’ put on them by others (usually the marginally situated) 
(Grasswick 2018: 83-84). These conditions of responsibly placed trust are ‘competency and 
sincerity/care’. The competency condition requires that an agent knows what they are talking about 
(Grasswick 2018: 77-78). The sincerity/care condition requires that an agent be not merely epistemically 
upright (in the sense of telling the truth) but also genuinely cares for the subject of epistemic concern 
(Grasswick 2018: 80-81). 
These forms of epistemic injustice I have highlighted are by no means exhaustive of the growing literature 
on the topic. However, I have chosen to highlight these for two reasons. The first is the simple reason 
that they are the ones I refer to often in the course of this research. The second is that these forms of 
epistemic injustice emphasise central themes that are a perfect segue to setting up the argument I make 
in this dissertation. One of the features central to the debates on epistemic injustice that these forms 
highlight is that the members of socially marginalised groups are being wronged and harmed in their 
capacity as knowers. These epistemic wrongs and harms, to a large extent, stem from the prior social 
wrongs and harms that the marginalised already experience. The relationship between the social and 
14 
 
epistemic wrongs and harms is symbiotic. They are ‘two sides of the same coin [that are] mutually 
supportive and reinforcing each other’ (Medina 2013: 27). When we see privilege and underprivilege in 
society, it is often a symptom of some historically persistent instance of violence and oppression 
(colonialism, slavery, patriarchy, heteronormativity, et cetera). When these social injustices lead to 
instances of epistemic injustice, it also carries its epistemic brand of violence and oppression. I elaborate 
more on the relevance of this point and the foregoing analysis on forms of epistemic injustice to the 
argument I make in this dissertation before the end of this chapter (section 1.3). In the meantime, I use 
the next two sub-sections, to look at attempts in the literature to theorise certain forms of epistemic 
violence and oppression that are similarly relevant to the argument I make.  
1.2.2. Epistemic Violence  
Dotson (2011: 238) defines epistemic violence as ‘a refusal, intentional or unintentional, of an audience 
to communicatively reciprocate a linguistic exchange owing to pernicious ignorance’. I break down 
Dotson’s definition of epistemic violence into two parts to highlight its centrality to the argument I make 
here. The first is on the theme of communicative reciprocity and the second is on the theme of pernicious 
ignorance.  
Dotson draws on Jennifer Hornsby’s (1995: 134) conception of communicative reciprocity. According 
to Hornsby, communicative reciprocity is the condition that enables the successful performance of 
speech acts. That is, when an audience understands and recognises the speech act of the other as it is 
meant to be, we have an instance of reciprocal communicative action.  
This is similar to the idea of the ‘responsible hearer’ argued for by Fricker (2007: 67). Suppose I, a black 
person, say, ‘I have been unlawfully profiled and harassed by the police’. If my audience understands this 
as a racially motivated case of police brutality, then the reciprocal terms for my communicative act have 
been met. However, if my audience takes this to be a case of yet another black person exaggerating and 
lying about police brutality, then the reciprocal terms of my communicative act have not been met. Simply 
put, then, communicative acts are successful when the intention of the speaker is adequately understood 
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by the audience. Dotson (2011) makes it clear that not all cases of failed communicative exchange result 
in epistemic violence. The key element is what she calls ‘pernicious ignorance’. 
Dotson defines pernicious ignorance, as reliable ignorance that leads to harm. ‘Reliable ignorance is 
ignorance that is consistent or follows from a predictable epistemic gap in cognitive resources’ (Dotson 
2011: 238). So, if I say, ‘Black lives matter’ and my audience fails to understand that what I mean is black 
lives matter too rather than only black lives matter, it is an instance of epistemic violence caused by 
pernicious ignorance.3 The pernicious ignorance in this scenario is due to the harm I face as a black 
person and the effect of my audience’s epistemic pushback. ‘Epistemic pushback’4, here, refers to a form 
of resistance that members of socially dominant groups show towards the epistemic resources of the 
socially marginalised. This is especially the case when these epistemic resources of the socially 
marginalised threaten to disrupt the undue privileges that members of socially dominant groups enjoy. 
Like in the cases of wilful ignorance I have already highlighted, this epistemic pushback leads to the 
creation and sustenance of ignorance among the socially dominant groups. This wilful element to it makes 
it a form of reliable ignorance by creating a predictable epistemic gap in the cognitive resources of my 
audience (ibid).  That is, my audience’s lack of knowledge about the social peculiarities of a black person’s 
experiences, and their lack of openness to conversations that might prevent this ignorance is the reason 
why this gap exists in the knowledge economy.  
The failure in reciprocal linguistic exchange and pernicious ignorance lead to epistemic violence in 
testimonial exchanges according to Dotson. These features, and how they are evinced, are similar to the 
forms of epistemic injustice I highlighted above. Recall that testimonial injustice and interpretative 
injustice occur due to prejudicial stereotypes that guide the credibility we give to testimony and our 
interpretation of them, respectively. These stereotypes, and the dynamics within testimonial and 
interpretative injustice are manifest in communicative exchanges – or failures thereof. So, when my 
 
3 See also Atkins (2019). 
4 Alison Bailey (2017) uses this term in her analysis of ‘privilege-preserving epistemic pushback’. 
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testimony is given low credibility or interpreted wrongly due to stereotypes held against me, there is a 
failure in communication. This is due to the hearer’s failure to meet the condition of communicative 
reciprocity. That is, they fail to hear me as I intend to be heard. In cases of epistemic injustice, this failure 
is due to prejudicial stereotypes held against me. 
As I have stated, hermeneutical injustice, wilful hermeneutical ignorance, and contributory injustice are 
forms of epistemic injustice that occur due to an intentional or unintentional lack of linguistic resources. 
In the case of hermeneutical injustice, this lack is caused by hermeneutical marginalisation. In the case of 
wilful hermeneutical ignorance and contributory injustice, it is caused by the dominantly situated 
knower’s efforts to obscure and ignore the epistemic resources of the marginally situated knowers from 
the collective social understanding. The ignorance created by these forms of epistemic injustice is ‘reliable 
ignorance’. Reliable ignorance ‘is the ignorance that is consistent or follows from a predictable epistemic 
gap in cognitive resources’ (Dotson 2011: 238, author’s emphasis). So, when I struggle to make sense of 
my experience due to hermeneutical marginalisation, or when, even though I make sense of my 
experience, the resources with which I do so are obscured from the collective social understanding by 
the dominantly situated knowers, a predictable epistemic gap is created. This is what creates reliable 
ignorance. Any society where certain groups are the consistent recipients of these injustices and violence 
is an oppressive society. At the core of it, these epistemic injustices and violence aim at sustaining 
oppressive regimes, both socially and epistemically. We can conceive of social oppression in different 
lights but in the kind of cases I am interested in here, how should we understand epistemic oppression? 
1.2.3. Epistemic Oppression 
Dotson defines epistemic oppression as ‘a persistent and unwarranted infringement on the ability to 
utilise persuasively shared epistemic resources that hinder one’s contributions to knowledge production’ 
(2014: 116). So, as with the examples of epistemic injustices above, I am a victim of epistemic oppression 
insofar as i) my testimony is taken and understood falsely (due to prejudicial stereotypes), ii) I lack the 
resources to participate in, or contribute to, the collective knowledge economy and iii) even when I do 
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attempt to contribute, my contribution is obscured from the collective social understanding in a way that 
preserves the undue superior position of members of the socially dominant groups.  
Dotson identifies three strata of this epistemic oppression and tags them first, second and third-order 
epistemic exclusion. The primary difference between these three forms of epistemic exclusion is the 
change required to remedy it. For first-order epistemic exclusion, the change required to remedy it is for 
agents within an epistemic framework to follow what that framework dictates. This is because first-order 
epistemic exclusion is caused by ‘inefficiency within shared epistemic resources’ (Dotson 2014: 123, author’s 
emphasis). So, for example, if the reason my testimony about police brutality does not get the required 
uptake is that my audience holds, and is guided by prejudicial stereotypes about me in that instance of 
communicative exchange, I am a victim of first-order exclusion.  
The change required to remedy second-order exclusion is for agents within an epistemic framework to 
utilise all the resources available to them in that epistemic framework. This is because second-order 
exclusion is caused by ‘insufficient shared epistemic resources’ (Dotson 2014: 126, author’s emphasis). So, 
for example, if the reason my testimony about police brutality does not get the required uptake is that 
my audience does not listen to black people within their epistemic framework, I am a victim of second-
order exclusion.  
The change that is required to remedy third-order epistemic exclusion, is for the agents within an 
epistemic framework to look outside their current framework for alternative epistemic resources. This is 
because third-order exclusion is caused by ‘inadequate dominant, shared epistemic resources’ (Dotson 
2014: 129, author’s emphasis). So, for example, if the reason my testimony about police brutality does 
not get the required uptake is that the dominantly shared epistemic framework does not have the 
resources to make sense of my testimony, I am a victim of third-order epistemic exclusion. 
Dotson further categorises these forms of epistemic exclusion according to their reducibility and 
irreducibility to social forms of oppression. The first and second-order epistemic exclusion falls under 
the reducible forms of epistemic oppression while third-order epistemic exclusion falls under the 
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irreducible category. The main difference between these two categories is the sources of the change 
required to remedy them. For first and second-order epistemic exclusion, the problem can be addressed 
by utilising resources within the same epistemological system to effect change. While for third-order 
epistemic exclusion, the problem ‘can only begin to be addressed through recognition of the limits of 
one’s overall epistemological frameworks’ (Dotson 2014: 116). I focus, in more detail, on third-order 
epistemic exclusion. This is because of the similarities between its main idea of irreducibility to social 
forms of oppression and the central intuition of my thesis.  
When Dotson (2014: 116) says third-order epistemic exclusion ‘follows from a feature of epistemological 
systems themselves [and can only] …be addressed through recognition of the limits of one’s overall 
epistemological frameworks’, the feature of epistemological systems that Dotson refers to here is 
‘epistemological resilience’. Epistemological resilience is the ‘resistance-to-disturbance’ of an 
epistemological system prior to the need for change or adaptation (Dotson 2014: 121). So, if, for example, 
I complain about police brutality as a black person and the response I get are statistics and legal backing 
to show that my complaints are unwarranted, the resilience of the dominant epistemic system is at play. 
The epistemic system here is the one that relies on these methods (statistics, laws, et cetera) as a way for 
justifying its claims to supposed superiority. The disturbance is my claim that something is wrong within 
this system. And the resilience is the ability of this system to strip my claim of all legitimacy without 
needing to change itself.  
In this negative form, epistemological resilience (seen as a poor epistemic habit) leads to a sort of 
blindness to other ‘social imaginaries’ (Medina 2011: 28). That is, it leads to the creation of ignorance 
about the lived realities of the marginally situated among the dominantly situated. In its positive form, 
epistemological resilience is what gives our epistemic systems the stability that enables us to rely on them 
(Dotson 2014: 122). Its negative form is what fuels third-order epistemic exclusion. I refrain from 
categorising any of the aforementioned forms of epistemic injustice into Dotson’s first, second and third-
order epistemic exclusion. This is because I think it is important to look at each context to know where 
that instance of epistemic injustice fits. But for now, it is noteworthy that my idea of hegemonic injustice 
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(which I begin arguing for in the next chapter) can fall under a third-order epistemic exclusion in the 
sense that the change it requires is primarily from outside of the oppressive epistemic system. However, 
hegemonic injustice is crucially different from the forms of epistemic oppression that third-order 
epistemic exclusion can make sense of when we consider the dynamics of who the victim and perpetrator 
of hegemonic injustice can be. In cases of hegemonic injustice, it is possible that a victim can be an 
accomplice to the injustice they suffer and, in some cases, simultaneously by the perpetrator of the 
injustice. In the cases of third-order epistemic exclusion, the victim and the perpetrator are distinct. I say 
more on this as I develop my argument through the chapters of this dissertation. In the meantime, let 
me hint at some of the intuitions that are central to my argument. 
Recall that I have mentioned that when the resilience of an epistemic system takes a negative tone, it 
becomes a conduit for epistemic exclusion. In Dotson’s example with the allegory of the cave, the victim 
of this third-order epistemic exclusion is the ‘outsider’ to this epistemic framework who is excluded due 
to an inadequacy in the dominantly shared epistemic resources (Dotson 2014: 129 -130). Let us call the 
outsider ‘Agent A’ and the dominant epistemic system ‘Framework X’. Agent A is a victim of third-order 
epistemic exclusion if she a) proposes an idea outside the theoretical scope of Framework X, and b) 
Framework X’s inadequacies make it impossible for it to make sense of Agent A’s idea while being 
resilient enough to dismiss the said idea. The victim of the epistemic exclusion here is clearly Agent A. 
The perpetrator of this exclusion at a systemic level is Framework X. At an individual level, we can 
imagine someone in the community where Framework X is operative applying the pushback to Agent X 
through reliance on the resilience of Framework X. This person becomes the perpetrator of third-order 
epistemic exclusion. Let us consider an example where the distinction between the victim and the 
perpetrator is not so clear-cut.  
The Grateful Graduate*: Peter obtained a PhD from a prestigious Western university. When 
asked in an interview what he attributes his success to, Peter talks about his childhood growing 
up in Nigeria. For Peter, the reason for his success is that as a child in Nigeria, he went to schools 
where he was taught ‘correctly’ (a Western curriculum) and taught to speak the ‘proper way’ 
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(English), and was scolded when he spoke in his home language (Urhobo) which is considered 
to be ‘vernacular’, and ‘uncivilised’. Peter becomes a teacher in a Nigerian school and asks his 
students not to speak in their mother-tongue because it is unintelligible and uncivilised. (This is 
common in most states that have been colonised). Rather, they should all speak in English 
because it is a symbol of civility and intelligibility. However, one of Peter’s students, Amina, 
refuses to abide by this and claims that her local language is perfectly intelligible and civilised. 
From this scenario, we see that Peter, and his society, operates from an epistemic framework that takes 
the English Language to be superior to others as a symbol of intelligibility and civility. Call this epistemic 
framework A. When Amina makes the claim that her language is also perfectly intelligible and civilised, 
she adopts a novel epistemic framework that stands in resistance to epistemic framework A. Let us call 
Amina’s epistemic framework B. Now, if the resilience of epistemic framework A provides sufficient 
reasons to discredit Amina’s opposition, and is inadequate to make sense of Amina’s claim, then Amina 
is a victim of third-order epistemic oppression. This is because nothing in epistemic framework A is up 
to the task of changing how they understand intelligibility and civility. When we also think of this in terms 
of epistemic injustice, we can flesh out different forms of epistemic injustice that Amina is a victim of, 
and Peter is a perpetrator of. I agree with all this. 
However, if we take a step back, we see that Peter and his community did not come up with epistemic 
framework A independently. Rather, it is something that they have come to accept over time due to the 
impact of colonisation. It has become hegemonic in their collective understanding. Peter, and his 
community, are effectively victims of a sort of epistemic injustice. It is a form of epistemic injustice where 
the victims can be accomplices to the injustices that they suffer. This form of epistemic injustice is crucial 
in helping us make sense of instances of epistemic injustice where there is no resistance or friction against 
the injustice. Rather, we even get victims being appreciative of the system that oppresses them, as is the 
case with Peter. This is the central intuition of the argument I make later in this dissertation. But to fully 
elucidate it, let me first look at the central harm that the forms of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, 
and epistemic oppression I have highlighted thus far cause to the agent. 
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1.3. A Central Harm 
In very general terms, I have shown how epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and epistemic oppression 
are forms of epistemic wrongs that harm5 an agent in their capacity as a knower. But what exactly is the 
nature of this harm? And, is there a way for us to capture the entirety, or at least the majority of this harm 
in a single concept? 
Fricker (2007: 43) notes a purely epistemic harm that might arise from instances of testimonial injustice. 
That harm is that ‘knowledge that would be passed on to a hearer is not received’ (ibid). That is, a gap is 
created in the knowledge economy when a listener allows their prejudicial stereotypes to distort their 
credibility judgement of a speaker. What would have been known is thereby obscured. This harm to the 
knowledge economy has an effect on the speaker who experiences credibility deficit due to prejudicial 
stereotypes. The speaker is prevented ‘from successfully putting knowledge into the public domain’ (ibid). 
Fricker sees this as an ‘unfreedom of our collective speech situation’ (ibid). While Fricker (2007: 44) goes 
further to focus on the ethical dimension of these harms, I will remain with this epistemic dimension. 
This ‘unfreedom of our collective speech situation’, coupled with the lack of uptake that Fricker mentions 
as the epistemic dimension of the harm that victims of testimonial injustice experience summarise some 
of the debates on silencing (I discuss this in more detail in the next chapter). As Ishani Maitra (2009: 331) 
puts it, ‘when a speaker is communicatively disabled, she is thereby deprived of …[the] benefits that 
speech can offer’. If we understand silencing (as the literature rightly does) as a form of communicative 
disablement, and we understand testimonial injustice as instances of deficit in credibility judgment due 
to prejudicial stereotypes which communicatively disables the epistemic agent, we can see silencing as 
one of the primary epistemic harms caused by testimonial injustice. 
This sentiment that sees silencing as a primary harm of epistemic injustice is shared by Peet (2017: 3425). 
Peet understands cases of interpretative injustice to be cases of silencing, ‘since if one misinterprets the 
 
5 Recall the distinction between wrongs and harms that I made in the introduction. That is fully operative here. 
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content of an utterance then one thereby fails to recognise the illocutionary act being performed, or the 
speaker’s communicative intention’ (ibid). The correlation between interpretative injustice and silencing 
that Peet draws is based on Maitra’s (2009) conception of silencing, which in turn relies on H. P. Grice’s 
(1989) conditions on speaker meaning. For Maitra, a speaker is silenced when they are communicatively 
disabled. This communicative disablement happens  
iff [the speaker] is unable to fully successfully perform her intended communicative 
act, because her intended audience fails to satisfy either the second or the third of her 
(Gricean) intentions. (Miatra 2009: 327-328) 
These intentions, according to Grice’s conditions on speaker meaning are as follows: 
A speaker S means something by uttering x iff, for some audience A, S utters x 
intending: 
(i) A to produce response r; 
(ii) A to think (recognize) that S intends (i); and, 
(iii) A’s fulfilment of (ii) to give him a reason to fulfil (i). (Grice 1989: 92) 
Simply put, when an agent fails to get their intended uptake from an audience, they are silenced on 
Miatra’s account. When this failure is caused by prejudicial stereotype and further leads to a wrong 
interpretation of a speaker’s word, they are a victim of interpretative injustice on Peet’s account. As with 
the case of testimonial injustice that I have mentioned, this epistemic injustice leads to the silencing of 
an epistemic agent and this creates a gap in the knowledge economy. 
This gap in the knowledge economy is what the hermeneutical strands (hermeneutical injustice, wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance and contributory injustice) of epistemic injustice try to highlight or remedy. 
Apart from the silencing that leads to this gap, the gap in the knowledge economy further perpetrates 
silencing. Since, when a group lacks the resources to make sense of their experiences, or find their 
epistemic resources being obscured from the collective understanding, they fail to participate successfully 
in epistemic exchanges. Their epistemic capabilities are disabled to a large extent. This disablement 
amounts to a communicative failure that is encapsulated in Dotson’s (2011: 236) conception of epistemic 
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violence which I have already highlighted. It is a ‘failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to 
meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges’ (ibid). 
When I focus on silencing as the primary harm that arises from instances of epistemic injustice, epistemic 
violence, and epistemic oppression, I do not in any way mean to suggest that this is the only harm, or 
even the worst imaginable harm. It is easy to imagine cases where the harms that result from these 
epistemic vices have severe physical and moral implications, including death. My decision to focus on 
silencing as the primary harm here is that on the epistemic level, it is the harm that does the most damage 
to the agent and the knowledge economy. The agent experiences a level of epistemic frustration when 
their testimony fails to get the required uptake. And a gap is created in the knowledge economy when 
this lack of uptake results in deficiencies in our hermeneutical resources. 
1.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered a rough overview of some of the debates in the literature that are central 
to the argument I make in this research. I started by hinting at the main difference between traditional 
analytic epistemology and social epistemology. This is crucial to show, crudely at this stage, that the 
debates on social epistemology leading to the field of epistemic injustice are a legitimate part of 
epistemology. The link between the social and the epistemic that social epistemology highlights is the 
bedrock for debates that consider epistemic variants of social phenomena like injustice, violence, and 
oppression. 
I then highlighted the epistemic variants of these phenomena. They are epistemic injustice, epistemic 
violence, and epistemic oppression. I did this to show what phenomena, for the most part, are being 
considered as epistemic bad practices. While these epistemic bad practices are wrong to varying degrees 
and can lead to different harms, I isolated silencing as a central epistemic harm that they lead to. This is 
because it is a salient harm that cuts across these epistemic bad practices, and it is the perfect starting 




‘The vulnerability of a (woman) speaker follows from her dependence upon an audience; if she is to be heard, her 
dependence requires an audience who is both willing and capable of hearing her as a speaker and a knower.’ (Anderson 
and Bunnin 2020: 38) 
2.1. Epistemic Silencing 
The literature on epistemic silencing is vast and intricately nuanced. I start this chapter by trying to unpack 
the nuances relevant to my argument. In section 2.1, I look at different accounts of silencing in the 
literature. One thing they have in common is that an agent is silenced when they fail in their intended 
communicative act. In section 2.2, I look at the response of anger that silencing elicits from its victim. I 
argue here that this anger is an appropriate response to the injustice that a person being silenced faces. I 
also argue here that the anger that victims of silencing show is a way to track instances of epistemic 
injustice both for the victim and for the perpetrator of these injustices. With the intuition that anger is a 
central element of epistemic injustice that involves silencing firmly rooted, I establish the counterintuition 
that in some cases where someone is a victim of epistemic injustice, this emotional response of anger is 
not present. Rather we see the victims being appreciative of the harm they face.  
This leads me to my central aim in this chapter, which is to argue for a phenomenon I call appreciative 
silencing. By appreciative silencing, I mean those instances of epistemic silencing where  
i) the perpetrator relies on ‘hegemonic intuitions’,  
ii) the victim is neither resistant to the oppression they experience, nor do they recognise it as 
such, and 
iii)  the victim shows or at least experiences appreciation towards the system that oppresses them.  
I unpack the details of appreciative silencing through an analogy. Two crucial points I make about 
appreciative silencing are that it is possible due to a) similar hegemonic intuitions that the victims and 
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perpetrators of appreciative silencing share and b) a foundational epistemic problem. I explain these 
elements in more detail in what follows in this chapter. 
2.2. Silencing 
There are many ways that a speaker can keep silent. There is the simple form where the speaker simply 
keeps quiet and refuses to say anything. This could be due to different reasons. On the one hand, it could 
be that the speaker does not know what to say and simply keeps silent. On the other hand, it could be 
that the speaker is being prevented from speaking either through threats or similar divisive means. These 
instances of silencing involve ‘silence’ in the colloquial sense. Nuanced analysis of when people keep 
silent in this manner can be done to flesh out potential instances of epistemic injustice. However, this 
has not been the primary focus of theorists. Most of the literature on silencing focuses on instances where 
an agent does speak but their words fail to achieve its intended aim or when an agent experiences a 
breakdown of the reciprocity condition for effective communication. 
Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby (Langton 1993, Hornsby and Langton 1998), relying on J. L. Austin’s 
(1962) speech act theory, distinguish three kinds of silencing, which provides a helpful frame for my 
argument. 6 The first is ‘locutionary silencing’, which occurs when an agent is stopped from speaking 
(silencing in the colloquial sense). For example, if I am threatened by the police not to speak up about 
their brutality towards me. The second is ‘perlocutionary frustration’, which occurs when the appropriate 
locution fails to attain the desired effects. For example, when I try to persuade someone that I am a 
victim of police brutality, but they refuse to believe me. The third is ‘illocutionary disablement’, which 
occurs when the appropriate locution fails to result in the intended act. For example, when I tell the 
police to stop harassing me, but they continue.  
 




In all these three cases, there has been a breakdown of the reciprocity condition (Hornsby 1995: 134) for 
effective communication to varying degrees. (I have talked about this more extensively in section 1.2.2 
above.) That is, my audience fails to recognise my speech act as it is meant to be recognised. This 
breakdown in the reciprocity condition for effective communication is the focal point of more recent 
analysis on silencing. 
On one account, I can be silenced pre-emptively (Fricker 2007: 130). This means that as a knower, I can be 
excluded from participating in a testimonial exchange when the other already has prejudicial stereotypes 
about/against me and what I have to say. For instance, if there is to be a conversation about police best 
practices, the organiser can decide not to even invite me to the event because they already suspect that 
whatever I have to say will be related to police brutality. To count as a case of pre-emptive silencing, it is 
important that their assessment of my potential testimony is not grounded on any evidence. Rather, they 
have some prejudicial stereotypes about me as a black person and i) assume that I will always talk about 
police brutality, and ii) do not consider my testimonies of this sort to hold any credibility. This sort of 
silencing, to my mind, can be classified under Langton and Hornsby notion of ‘locutionary silencing’. 
This is because when an agent is pre-emptively silenced, they are prevented from speaking. On Fricker’s 
account, this is due to prejudicial stereotypes against an agent and the testimony they might have. These 
prejudicial stereotypes lead the perpetrator of this sort of silencing to pre-emptively silence its victims. 
On a second account, I can be silenced by being treated as an epistemic object (Fricker 2007:132). This 
means that rather than being treated as a reliable informant that can participate in epistemic activities, I 
am treated as a mere source of information. For example, if I am asked to participate in the discussion 
about best practices among police officers, and my testimony on police brutality gets the desired uptake 
and leads to legitimate conversations, I am being treated as an epistemic agent. If, however, my testimony 
about police brutality is taken as evidence that all black people are overly sensitive on the subject of police 
brutality, or are prone to over-racialising or exaggerating instances of police brutality, I am being treated 
as an object from which information is gleaned. This is especially the case if the reason why my testimony 
gets this sort of treatment is because of some prejudicial stereotypes about me as a black man.  Notice 
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how in the first instance, I am an active participant in knowledge formation and my testimony gets the 
desired uptake and in the second instance, I am a passive object from which knowledge is gleaned and 
my testimony does not get the desired uptake. 
Pohlhaus (2014: 106) extends Fricker’s argument on epistemic objectification, contending that rather 
than seeing it in terms of a subject/object relationship, we should see it in terms of a subject/other 
relationship. This is because Pohlhaus sees the victim of the epistemic injustice here as something more 
than an object but less than a subject. The knower here is treated as a kind of ‘truncated subject’ (Pohlhaus 
2014: 99).  That is, when information is taken from my testimony about police brutality and used by the 
other, it does not mean they do not see me as a subject. They see me as one, albeit a subject whose 
subjectivity is reliant on theirs and their goals. Both formulations of this sort of silencing have elements 
of Langton and Hornsby’s notions of perlocutionary frustration and illocutionary disablement. The 
perlocutionary frustration in this instance is evident when my testimony fails to gain the required uptake. 
My desired uptake is that my testimony should highlight the racially disproportionate level of police 
brutality. Instead, it is seen as evidence of something else. The illocutionary disablement is evident in how 
my testimony fails to attain its intended result of eliciting change in existing policing practices that are 
discriminatory. 
On a third account, I can be silenced when my audience fails to recognise me as a knower. Dotson calls 
this kind of silencing ‘testimonial quieting’ (2011: 242). This, again, speaks to the reciprocity condition 
for effective communication. When I testify, it is important that my audience identify, or at least, 
recognise me as a knower for me to offer testimony. When this dependence on my audience is not met, 
I am silenced. So, for example, if I want to give my testimony about the effects of police brutality on the 
black community, it is important that my audience sees me as someone who knows the effect of police 
brutality on black communities. If they do not, they cannot satisfy the reciprocity condition for effective 
communication and thus, I will be silenced. 
On a fourth account, if I am about to give the same testimony on the effects of police brutality on black 
communities and I notice that I have the same audience as the last time, who will not get what I am 
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saying, I can decide to truncate or adjust my testimony to the audience. Dotson calls this variety of 
silencing ‘testimonial smothering’ (2011: 244). The reason for my perception of my audience’s inability 
to understand me is that the topic of conversation is one that is charged with complex social and epistemic 
concern that rouses the same kind of response from the same kind of audience. So, my decision to 
truncate my testimony about the effects of police brutality on black communities relies on the three 
characteristic features of this kind of silencing identified by Dotson. They are a) my testimony is unsafe 
and risky; b) my audience is incompetent with regards to the content of my testimony, and c) this 
incompetence follows from pernicious ignorance (Ibid). 
While these last two conceptions of silencing identified by Dotson might not fit squarely into Langton 
and Hornsby’s three categories of silencing, they highlight two important points. The first is the 
importance of the dependency condition for effective communication. When I give testimony, it is not 
solely up to me to communicate effectively. I rely on my audience to be ‘responsible listeners’. If they fail 
at their task, I effectively fail in communicating. The second point is the effect of past failures of this 
dependency condition on future speech acts. When I tailor my testimony to attend to my audience’s 
deficiencies in a way that does not capture my message, I am being silenced. Instances like this should be 
distinguished from cases where I intend to be accessible (by speaking simply to a non-professional 
audience or using language my audience will understand). When I try to be accessible, I am not 
presupposing pernicious ignorance in my audience. However, when I truncate my speech due to pernicious 
ignorance, it is an instance of testimonial smothering that silences me. 
With all four accounts of silencing I have considered; a salient feature is that the victims experience an 
undue pushback that obscures their experience and silences them. These are some forms that the wrongs 
of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and epistemic oppression manifest themselves. But what 




In all the instances of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, epistemic oppression, and the resultant 
silencing, the emotions felt by the victims almost certainly involve anger7. This is a legitimate response to 
injustice. When people are oppressed and protest this oppression, speak up against it, or fight it, they are 
expressing the anger that these injustices elicit from them. This is all well and good when responding to 
social oppression. However, anger has not been seen as an acceptable tool for theorising within the 
epistemic space until relatively recently. It has, instead, been seen as being overly emotional, devoid of 
rationality, and in some cases, an expected pervasive response from members of certain social groups (I 
am thinking of the stereotype of the ‘angry black woman’ here). Overall, emotions, and anger specifically, 
are perceived as illegitimate tools in epistemic discourse. But how is this perception enforced? 
Alison Bailey (2018) argues for two ‘tone management’ practices that act as ‘angry knowledge’ 
management. Tone management, in this context, is a practice that  
weakens [the] epistemic credibility [of an agent’s testimony] by targeting, isolating, and 
attempting to manage the affective content (the speaker’s manner of speaking) and the 
epistemic content (the message) in testimony. (Bailey 2018: 97, author’s emphasis)  
What this does is that rather than directing the focus on the epistemic content of ‘angry knowledge’, the 
affective content is focused on instead, in a way that undermines the epistemic content. ‘Angry 
knowledge’, here, is understood as a kind of resistant knowledge that pushes back against oppressive 
systems. It is knowledge born out of a recognition that legitimate parts of my life are obscured from the 
collective social understanding in a way that undermines my epistemic and human agency. The emotion 
of anger that this elicits in me becomes a legitimate way to speak up against these injustices. Anger 
 
7 It is not necessarily the case that all instances of injustice elicit the emotional response of anger. It is possible to imagine 
scenarios where an instance of injustice is met with resolve or determination to resist it, despair when it is particularly 
overwhelming, fear when it is accompanied by serious physical harm, et cetera. Instances like these should not be 
overlooked and they are valuable themes for further enquiry. My decision to focus on anger is because of its centrality to 
my argument and the scant philosophical attention it has received in the literature. (Thanks to Gaile Pohlhaus for making 
me see this point). 
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becomes a form of epistemic resistance (Bailey 2018). It is an emotional response that is elicited, or at 
least, invoked by an instance of injustice. While anger’s expression is generally seen after an instance of 
injustice, in most of the kind of cases I am interested in here, anger is often in response to historical and 
continual manifestations of injustices on a group (colonialism, patriarchy, and slavery, for instance). When 
these resistant practices of anger are shown in the public domain, they are generally not accepted by 
dominantly situated knowers. Two tone management practices used by dominantly situated knowers to 
push back against this angry knowledge are identified by Bailey as ‘tone policing’ and ‘tone vigilance’ 
(Bailey 2018: 97). 
Tone policing happens when, for example, I complain about racism in the workplace and rather than 
focus on the complaint I am making, I am told to speak in a calmer voice so that I can be better understood. 
Tone policing of this nature does at least three things. First, it delegitimises anger as an appropriate 
response to the suffering and injustice I am facing. Second, I am disrespected as a knower since i) my 
testimony is treated as unworthy of hearing and ii) I am deemed to be wrong in my assessment of the 
harm I faced (Bailey 2018: 97). Third, the comfort of my audience is prioritised over the harms of 
injustices I experience. This comfort is not sought due to a direct threat of physical harm. This is because 
the other form of tone management that happens is due to what Bailey (2018: 98) calls ‘attributive anger’. 
This happens when even if I speak in a tone that the audience finds comfortable, I am attributed anger 
because of prejudicial stereotypes, for example, of an angry black person always talking about race. This 
form of attributive anger is what Bailey calls ‘tone vigilance’.  
‘Tone vigilance prompts an audience either to listen for anger in a speaker’s testimony, or to fold a 
perceived or imagined anger into the testimony’ (Bailey 2018: 99). This happens when, for example, my 
testimony about racism in the workplace is not listened to as such, but is listened to with the prejudicial 
stereotype of an angry black person always complaining about race in the background. What this does is 
that it creates an anger spiral where a) my testimony is seen as born out of anger rather than legitimate 
experiences and b) if I get angry at this interpretation, my anger is seen as a confirmation of (a), and my 
unreasonably emotional nature (Ahmed 2010: 68). So, if I complain about racism in the workplace, it is 
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interpreted as due to a choleric character rather than the reality that I am angry because of racism. If I 
get angry because of this interpretation of my testimony, my anger is then taken as evidence that I am 
simply an angry black person always talking about race. 
But what is this silencing, and pushback against angry knowledge trying to preserve for the dominantly 
situated knower? Bailey argues elsewhere for  
privilege-preserving epistemic pushback [as] …a variety of willful ignorance that many 
members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and 
structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience daily. (Bailey 
2017: 876)  
It is essentially an attempt on the part of the privileged to remain within their comfort zone by relying 
on the resilience of their epistemic systems to prevent genuine engagements with the lived experiences 
of members of socially marginalised groups. This is especially the case when this engagement might 
threaten aspects of their epistemic lives that give them undue advantages over others – that is, when their 
privilege is under threat. In this context, when my anger is not treated as a legitimate epistemic tool but 
pointed out as being an obstacle to my audience’s ability to hear me, I am silenced. This silence ensures 
that the conversation about racism in the workplace that I attempted to start is no longer had.  Instead, 
the trajectory of the discussion is dictated by my interlocutors, who focus on ways of quelling my anger. 
Thus, the position of privilege held by my audience is preserved. This is also the case when my testimony 
is dubbed angry due to prejudicial stereotypes held against me. This ‘epistemic friction’ (of privilege-
preserving epistemic pushback) that I experience is not beneficial to the knowledge economy because it 
is not a form of resistant knowledge (as my anger is), but, in Medina’s (2013) words, a ‘resistance to 
know’. 
In The Epistemology of Resistance, Jose Medina (2013: 56) talks about a form of resistance that is not 
beneficial epistemic friction. He calls this ‘resistance to know’. This is a form of resistance that members 
of socially dominant groups exhibit as a way to maintain their position of privilege, and this, in turn, leads 
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to the perpetuation of ignorance. Like Poulhaus’s (2012) conception of wilful hermeneutical ignorance 
and Dotson’s (2012) conception of contributory injustice, this is a form of ‘active ignorance’. This means 
that when members of socially marginalised groups try to make sense of their experiences or make 
discomforting contributions to the knowledge economy, they experience resistance from members of the 
socially dominant groups. This resistance can come in different ways, but they are encapsulated in one or 
many of the forms of epistemic or social injustices we have been made aware of. What this shows us is 
that, off the bat, members of socially marginalised groups already experience difficulty in communicating 
the injustices they face. Not simply because of a lack of hermeneutical resources but also due to several 
epistemically unjust tools that question or deny the epistemic credibility of members of socially 
marginalised groups. If being a victim of a good old social injustice is not enough reason to get angry, 
these epistemic injustices present members of socially marginalised groups with another reason to get 
angry. 
So, when people stand in resistance to social injustices, there is an epistemic element to their stance. This 
epistemic element is, simply, a stance against ignorance, of the wilful or unwilful variety. I have talked 
about different ways that wilful ignorance can be exhibited through my analysis of Pohlhaus’s (2012) 
conception of wilful hermeneutical ignorance and Dotson’s (2012) conception of contributory injustice. 
Just as a reminder, these happen when the dominantly situated knowers refuse to engage with the 
epistemic resources of the marginally situated knower because of fear that it might disturb their position 
of privilege. When the dominantly situated knowers are confronted with these marginally situated 
epistemic resources, they either ignore it outrightly or engage with it in a pervasive way that fosters 
‘privilege-preserving epistemic pushback’. That is, the dominantly situated fails to engage with the real 
issue that the marginally situated knower complains about but claims to employ ‘healthy’ critical reasoning 
or scepticism to discredit what the marginally situated knower is trying to say (Bailey 2017). When the 
marginally situated stand in resistant anger, this is one dimension of the ignorance they stand against. 
Narratives that employ these forms of wilful ignorance can be seen in simple and complex forms. One 
simple example is the response that follows Black Lives Matter protests. The most prominent of these is 
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the narrative that sees ‘All Lives Matter’ as the appropriate response to Black Lives Matter. Initially, All 
Lives Matter was seen as a way of standing in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movements (Atkins 
2019: 2). However, it is generally understood nowadays to be in direct opposition to it. This is due to the 
claim that the Black Lives Matter slogan is exclusionary to white people when their lives matter too 
(Atkins 2019: 1). There are a lot of ludicrous implications to this claim that I do not intend to focus on. 
I will, however, focus on what this claim seeks to obscure.  
When Black Lives Matter is met with All Lives Matter, two possible things could happen. The first is that 
in situations where the Black Lives Matter protester is not generous enough to explain to the anti-Black 
Lives Matter protester, the situation gets very confrontational. The second is that in situations where the 
Black Lives Matter protester is generous enough, they spend time trying to explain to the anti-Black Lives 
Matter protester why the Black Lives Matter slogan is not exclusionary. In both of these instances, the 
focus of the conversation changes from the injustices that the Black Lives Matter movement stands 
against, to accommodating the ‘ignorance’ of the anti-Black Lives Matter protester. Both instances lead 
to epistemic exploitation.  
Nora Berenstain (2016: 570) defines epistemic exploitation as the phenomenon that ‘occurs when 
privileged persons compel marginalized persons to produce an education or explanation about the nature 
of the oppression they face’. This sort of exploitation can be exploitative in many ways which I will not 
get into here8. What I am interested in here is that in addition to the exploitations that can accompany 
the All Lives Matter response to Black Lives Matter, this response is also a divisive move that does 
nothing to disturb the position of privilege held by the socially dominant groups. Rather, they feign 
conversation or alliance by focusing on arbitrary aspects of the movement like its slogan rather than 
focusing on what the movement aims to change. In cases where the Black Lives Matter protesters react 
even angrily to the All Lives Matter retort, it is in response to this pattern of wilful and active ignorance 
 
8 See Berenstain (2016) for an analysis of at least three ways that epistemic exploitation is exploitative and how this 
amounts to a form of epistemic injustice. 
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that seeks to obscure the epistemic merits in the black person’s testimony about their lived experiences 
of injustices. 
However, there is a more complex epistemic dimension to it if we look at the epistemic lives of the anti-
Black Lives Matter protesters. The pushback and wilful ignorance show how these anti-Black Lives 
Matter protesters try to protect their position of privilege by obscuring the lived experiences of the 
socially marginalised.9 What it fails to make very clear to us are elements of the epistemic character of 
these anti-Black Lives Matter protesters. Informed by the arguments I have made so far; these anti-Black 
Lives Matter protesters are committing at least one, often several forms of epistemic injustice, epistemic 
violence, or epistemic oppression. This is because they are placing the value of maintaining their unjust 
position of social privilege over the value of being epistemically faithful and just. And in the process, they 
harm the epistemic agency of the other. Let me explain. 
The primary harm of these epistemic bad practices (epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, epistemic 
oppression, silencing, and privilege-preserving epistemic pushback) is that they silence the victim. Again, 
I do not mean this claim to imply that silencing is the only harm that occurs, nor do I mean it to imply 
that it is the worst imaginable harm. My decision to focus on silencing is that it is the primary harm that 
flows across these forms of epistemic bad practices, and simultaneously affects the victim and the 
knowledge economy. When a victim is silenced in this way, they are worse off as humans. When we 
create a gap in the knowledge economy by silencing others, we are worse off as epistemic agents and our 
knowledge economy suffers from this creation of ignorance. This process is what elicits the resistant and 
angry reaction from members of socially and epistemically marginalised groups. This is an appropriate, 
legitimate, and common response to these epistemic bad practices. 
 
9 Atkins (2019) makes the argument that the ‘All Lives Matter’ response to ‘Black Lives Matter’ in some cases is a 
move by the anti-BLM protester to preserve their conception of themselves as virtuous. I have my doubts about 
the extent to which this claim by Atkins is true, but I do not have the space here to defend this intuition. 
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I take it that all these forms of epistemic bad practice are, at their core, aimed at maintaining the unfair 
advantages that members of socially dominant groups have. These advantages might be more prominent 
in the social structure in some cases than others, but at the core of all, there remains that epistemic 
element to it. This epistemic element is what sustains these oppressive systems and aids in the 
dehumanisation of epistemic agents. As has been shown already, anger is a legitimate response to injustice 
and in this anger lies a resistant knowledge that has the moral and epistemic force to pushback against 
oppressive systems. But how important is anger in tracking instances of epistemic oppression?  
In the foregoing, the centrality of anger as an appropriate response to injustice has been hopefully 
established. This anger serves as a catalyst in the formation of resistant knowledge and it is also an 
effective way to tell that someone is a victim of injustice. Hence, anger becomes an effective tracker of 
injustice. As was stated above, anger as a response to injustice in the social sphere has had longer and 
better reception than it has in the epistemic sphere. Although they are not mutually exclusive, anger in 
the social and the epistemic spheres makes different things apparent to us. In the social sphere, it points 
out an instance of injustice. Thus, when people protest police brutality, they are pointing out a particular 
instance of injustice. In the epistemic sphere, anger points out our unjust responses to the social injustices 
that a group face. These unjust responses are manifest in the different forms of epistemic injustice, 
epistemic violence and epistemic oppression that aim to obscure the experiences of the socially 
marginalised groups, while simultaneously sustaining the privilege of the dominantly situated. Thus, when 
a response to a marginalised group’s testimony about their experiences of injustice elicits anger from 
members of that group, it is most likely the case that this is an instance of epistemic injustice.  
Thus, if a victim of social injustice feels angry about the response their testimony about oppression gets, 
it is most likely the case that they are also a victim of epistemic injustice. This is an appropriate response 
and their anger becomes a way to track the epistemic oppression they experience. Similarly, if your 
response to another’s testimony about the injustices they face elicits an angry response from them, it is 
most likely the case that you are perpetuating an epistemic injustice against them. Anger in an epistemic 
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exchange becomes an effective way to track how instances of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and 
epistemic oppression can silence a victim.  
But is it possible for the opposite reaction of appreciation to point at some sort of injustice? Phrased 
differently, are there instances of epistemic oppression that contain all or most of the negative attributes 
identified above but lack that element of anger from the victim? To push it further, is it conceivable to 
talk of an appreciative, rather than angry, victim of epistemic oppression, or would such talk be some 
kind of category mistake? I argue for this novel variant of epistemic silencing in the section that follows. 
2.4. What about Silencing with no Anger?  
Is it possible for a victim of an epistemic harm to be appreciative of the harm? Recall the case of The 
Grateful Graduate* from the previous chapter (1.2.3). 
The Grateful Graduate*: Peter obtained a PhD from a prestigious Western university. When 
asked in an interview what he attributes his success to, Peter talks about his childhood growing 
up in Nigeria. For Peter, the reason for his success is that as a child in Nigeria, he went to schools 
where he was taught ‘correctly’ (a Western curriculum) and taught to speak the ‘proper way’ 
(English), and was scolded when he spoke in his home language (Urhobo) which is considered 
to be ‘vernacular’, and ‘uncivilised’. Peter becomes a teacher in a Nigerian school and asks his 
students not to speak in their mother-tongue because it is unintelligible and uncivilised. (This is 
common in most states that have been colonised). Rather, they should all speak in English 
because it is a symbol of civility and intelligibility. However, one of Peter’s students, Amina, 
refuses to abide by this and claims that her local language is perfectly intelligible and civilised. 
What I have done so far makes some of the epistemic wrongs in this scenario and the harms done to 
Peter intuitive. Through the process of colonisation, Peter is treated unfairly as an epistemic agent, he is 
a victim of epistemic injustice. The epistemic wrongs of colonialism are well documented (Ngugi 1986, 
Tobi 2020, Wiredu 2002, Ypi 2013). We know that epistemic colonisation is a case of epistemic injustice 
because the unfair treatment is because of one, either, or all of the following: i) prejudicial stereotypes 
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that negatively influence the uptake that Peter’s folks get (got), ii) hermeneutical marginalisation of the 
wilful or unwilful variety, iii) Peter’s social situatedness as member of a minority group. 
This leads to many related epistemic wrongs and harms. One such harm is the silencing of Peter’s use of 
his language. This harm can be understood in the simple sense of silencing (Maitra 2017, Langton 1993) 
which involves simply preventing Peter from speaking. Or it can be understood in more nuanced forms 
of silencing that involve a breakdown in communicative reciprocity or a failure to attain the desired 
uptake (Dotson 2011, Hornsby and Langton 1998, Fricker 2007). The appropriate response to this harm 
and other harms and wrongs of epistemic injustices as I have shown is anger (Bailey 2018). This anger is 
a catalyst for the creation of resistant knowledge that pushes back against ignorance and oppressive 
systems. However, there is a little twist to Peter’s situation that means it does not fit squarely with what 
is available in the literature so far. That is, Peter is appreciative of the system that silences him. He thanks 
the system for his ‘success’. This system that Peter is thankful to for his success is one that oppresses 
him. But with time, rather than being seen as an oppressive system, this system becomes hegemonic to 
the minds of Peter and his fellow victims. This becomes the epistemic framework that Peter and his 
community operate on. Earlier, I called this epistemic framework A. Within this epistemic framework A, 
we see how Peter is the victim of different varieties of epistemic injustice that lead to the formation of 
the intuitions about intelligibility that guides his epistemic system. These epistemic injustices that Peter 
is a victim of are linked to the wrongs and harms of epistemic colonisation. Let me briefly explain this. 
By epistemic colonisation, I mean those ‘practices that are harmful to the epistemic lives of the colonised 
as producers and receivers of knowledge’ (Tobi 2020). In Peter’s case, the most obvious of these practices 
involve the imposition of the English language on him. We can imagine how the process of this 
imposition involves some instances of testimonial injustice since the imposition is premised on the 
unintelligibility of Peter’s language. Any testimony that Peter would have given in his language would not 
get the credibility it deserves. The more obvious epistemic injustices that arise from a system of 
domination that imposes a different language on a people are the different variants of wilful and unwilful 
hermeneutical injustices I have already highlighted. When Peter is forced to use a different language, 
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concepts that are meaningful to him in his language are no longer available to him for the articulation of 
the injustices of which he is a victim. To the extent that languages are a conduit for knowledge and 
intelligibility, we can see how Peter is a victim of various hermeneutical strands of epistemic injustice. 
Having, hopefully, shown that Peter is a victim of various epistemic injustices, let me show how he is 
also a perpetrator of some epistemic injustices. When Peter discredits his students’ languages and teaches 
them to operate from epistemic framework A, he engages in a process that is similar to the one that is 
unjust to him. Peter, a victim of epistemic injustice, becomes a perpetrator of epistemic injustice. This is 
possible because Peter has come to accept Epistemic framework A as his operative epistemic framework. 
Neither anything within epistemic framework A nor anyone who fully believes in the claims of epistemic 
framework A offers resistance to this injustice and perpetuation of ignorance in the way that we have 
come to know and expect from the literature when there is an instance of epistemic injustice. The 
intuition remains, however, that Peter is the victim of epistemic injustice, and his actions, in turn, are 
instances of epistemic injustice to his students.  
When Amina refuses to abide by the claims of epistemic framework A and claims that her local language 
also has the element of intelligibility, she stands in resistance to epistemic framework A. This is the kind 
of resistance we are used to from the literature and generally expect in cases of epistemic injustice. I have 
argued in the previous section that resistant anger is an appropriate response and an effective way to 
track instances of epistemic injustice. In this scenario, we see this sort of resistance from Amina but not 
from Peter. However, the intuition that something is wrong in the scenario with Peter being appreciative 
and being an accomplice of sorts to his oppression is a valid intuition. Because, if we take a step back, 
we see that Peter and his community did not come up with this epistemic framework A independently. 
Rather, it is something that they have come to accept over time due to the impact of colonialism. It has 
become hegemonic in their collective understating. Peter is effectively a victim of what I tag hegemonic 
injustice.  
It is a form of epistemic injustice where the victims become accomplices to the injustices that they suffer. 
This form of epistemic injustice is crucial in helping us make sense of instances of epistemic injustice 
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where there is no resistance or friction against the injustice. Rather, we even get victims being appreciative 
of the system that oppresses them. I explore this concept of hegemonic injustice in more detail in the 
next chapter. In the meantime, let me focus on the harmful phenomenon that enables this injustice. I call 
this appreciative silencing. 
By appreciative silencing, I mean those instances of epistemic silencing where 1) the perpetrator relies on 
‘hegemonic intuitions’ (I explain this term shortly), 2) the victim is neither resistant to the oppression 
they experience, nor do they recognise it as such, and 3) the victim shows or at least experiences 
appreciation towards the system that oppresses them. By hegemonic intuitions here, I mean those in-
built standards of validation with which we judge epistemic systems. That is, the unquestioned, generally 
accepted, and biased epistemic practices that guide our epistemic lives. In the case of Peter, the 
hegemonic intuition is the accepted ‘superiority’ of the English language and the Western academic 
curriculum over those indigenous to Peter. So, when we consider a particular epistemic system to be 
superior to another, we do this based on some prejudgments. These prejudgments are our hegemonic 
intuitions. 
They count as hegemonic intuitions when they are the intuitions of the dominantly situated, accepted 
widely, and to a greater extent than other competing intuitions in a given epistemic community. So, apart 
from the harms done to Peter which are apparent and have been argued for by most theories on agential 
epistemic injustices, there is the harm done to the knowledge economy through the gap created by 
appreciative silencing. To the extent that language is a conveyor of meaning and intelligible epistemic 
resources, the appreciative silencing of Peter’s language (as an instance of appreciative silencing) creates 
a gap in the knowledge economy. That is, it leaves us worse off as epistemic agents when we fail to know 
what we should have known because of the pervasive nature of our epistemic practices. 
Similar to the cases of epistemic bad practices where anger is an appropriate response to injustice and 
acts as a way for us to track these injustices, appreciation in appreciative silencing has a similar normative 
and descriptive dimension. The normative dimension to it is that appreciation is an inappropriate 
response to hegemonic injustice. Although this is the common response as I will show in what follows 
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in this dissertation, it is inappropriate. This is what makes it counter-intuitive since we would expect that 
a victim of injustice would react differently to the injustice they face. The descriptive dimension to it is 
that when someone who is a victim of injustice is appreciative of the injustice they face (specifically in 
the epistemic space now), they are a victim of hegemonic injustice. This is because the hegemonic nature 
of the intuitions that cause hegemonic injustice means that its victims are most likely to be unaware of 
the oppressive situation they find themselves. 
2.5. Showing Appreciation for Harms 
What are the exact conditions for something to count as appreciative silencing and how do these come 
about? For ease of explanation, I first show how it is possible to have an appreciative response to injustice 
in a social context. I then show how this is analogous to what happens in the epistemic context.  
The Farmers and Miners Analogy: This is a case of social injustice in a colonial context that 
spans three generations. The first generation is my grandparents, the second, my parents, and the 
third, mine. My grandparents are a community of farmers. During their time, they witness the 
advent of the colonisers. These colonisers come into their community, take up a large chunk of 
land on the periphery of the village, and start mining gold from that piece of land. My grandparents 
are indifferent to this situation because there is no intrusion on their farmlands, and they are not 
harmed in any way. They live side by side with the colonisers, one a community of farmers, and 
the other a community of miners. Everything is harmonious. After a while, the colonisers form a 
community living alongside my grandparents and my parents at this point. My parents now view 
the colonisers as legitimate members of the larger community. Some years down the line, the 
mining activities of the colonisers begin to have some effects on the environment. The victims 
here are my parent’s community. The productivity of their farmlands dwindles. My parents are 
harmed by this. However, they are not angry. They see it as the natural course of things. To my 
parents, the colonisers are engaged in the ways of their community (mining), while they (my 
parents) are engaged in their ways (farming). With the dwindling productivity of our farmlands, my 
generation is left with no choice but to abandon farming altogether. Left jobless, we are offered 
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jobs to work in the mines of the colonisers. We are appreciative to the colonisers for this 
opportunity. They are now seen as our saviours and we gladly work for them. However, it remains 
the case that they are responsible for us losing our source of livelihood. We do not see this. All we 
see are people offering us a way out. This is a case of harm done to people that elicits a response 
of appreciation rather than anger. 
My choice of a colonial context example here is deliberate. The first reason for this is that the harm in 
this context is incremental and is disguised as good deeds. This disguise is what triggers the appreciative 
response at the end. The second reason for this choice of example is that it absolves me of the need to 
argue that there is a wrong involved since the wrongs of colonialism are well documented at this stage 
(Ngugi 1986, Tobi 2020, Wiredu 2002, Ypi 2013). However, what I argue for can be extended to other 
systems of oppression that, at least, have a historical and continual edge to them (patriarchy, for instance). 
Three features of The Farmers and Miners Analogy are noteworthy. First, the wrong in the scenario 
and the harms that are done take time. This time that it takes makes the wrongs and harms systemic and 
not obvious at first glance. The obscure nature of the wrongs and harms is what makes appreciation 
possible at the end. This incremental process is obvious in my example, but I do not mean to claim that 
this is the case in all instances of colonialism, since for most the effects were immediate.  
Second, the wrong becomes the norm. With my parents’ generation accepting the colonisers as legitimate 
members of the community, a new system is formed where it is difficult to know what it was like before 
that. This forms a communal knowledge that is passed on and engraved in the collective social 
understanding. The collective social understanding gains a hegemonic status that makes it difficult to see 
the harm in the coloniser’s actions. Third, eventually, when I am harmed by the wrongs done to me, I do 
not see it as such, and I am appreciative of the solution offered to me.  
As members of different communities, different resources are available to the miners and the farmers. 
This means that for me to move into the community of the miners and be able to work in the mines, I 
have to learn the language and ways of the miners and adapt to their epistemic system. If I ever become 
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successful as a miner, I will be thankful to the miners for the opportunity they and their epistemic system 
have offered me. I begin to see mining as superior (owing to the success it promises) and gradually lose 
touch with farming. All the while, the miners are responsible for the conditions that make me reliant on 
mining. When mining gains its dominant status as the paradigm for success for me and future generations, 
its dominance will be problematic. The problem with mining is how it took root. Recall, this involved 
the wrongful occupation of land. This led to processes that destroyed the lands of the original inhabitants 
of the community. 
If this analogy works in showing the wrongs and harms involved in a process like this, we should feel the 
same way for its epistemic equivalent. From this analogy, farming is analogous to the epistemic system 
of me and my folks, mining is analogous to the epistemic system of the colonisers and the land occupied 
is analogous to the mental universe of me and my folks. From now on, I will refer to the epistemic 
framework of my people and the epistemic framework of the colonisers as epistemic framework A and 
B respectively.  
Now, let me focus on the epistemic equivalent of two features of this example that are central to my 
conception of appreciative silencing. The first is the problematic element of an epistemic system that 
gains its dominance through a process similar to this (2.4.1). The second is the possibility of a harmful 
situation eliciting appreciation from its victim rather than anger (2.4.2). 
2.5.1. Foundational Epistemic Problems 
To elucidate on the problematic element of an epistemic system that gains its dominance through the 
kind of process I have shown above, I use Dotson’s (2018) argument for a ‘problem with epistemology’ 
that normalises oppressive conditions as my starting point. Dotson (2018: 130) defines a problem with 
epistemology as ‘problematic epistemological orientations one can have toward world-features’.  
Epistemological orientations, here, refers to expressed modes of defense for some claim 
and/or argument that are generated according to orienting variables. Orienting variables are 
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understood as markers that determine not just higher and lower epistemic status, but 
appropriate domain for epistemic considerations. (Dotson 2018: 131, author’s emphasis) 
For Dotson (2018: 130), this problem with epistemology makes it possible for us to come up with 
‘difficult-to-defeat arguments’ in support of a system that normalises oppressive conditions. In the 
context of my example, the evident ‘success’, and the future success that the coloniser’s epistemic system 
promise makes it difficult to argue that my failing epistemic system is comparable to the coloniser’s 
epistemic system. This measure of ‘success’ is equivalent to the ‘orienting variables’ on Dotson’s account. 
I take the idea from Dotson that it is difficult to successfully argue against oppressive epistemic systems 
at times due to the resilience they have built. This difficulty is what makes the appreciative response to 
oppression possible in some instances.  
What I add to Dotson’s claim is an emphasis on the initially oppressive, and historically persistent 
structures that create these oppressive epistemic systems. I tag this hybrid version ‘foundational epistemic 
problems’ in the rest of this dissertation. A foundational epistemic problem, in my usage, is an oppressive 
epistemic situation that arises from social situations of oppression that influences our epistemic systems 
in a way that is obscure, persistent, and thus, difficult to defeat. Let me explain what it means. 
The foundational epistemic problem with the coloniser’s epistemic framework in my example is tied to 
how it was formed. Recall, its formation involved the wrongful occupation of the mental universe of me 
and my folks. This led to processes that destroyed our epistemic framework. The focus here is on the 
distinct epistemic problem, even though there are ethical problems that might arise from the example I 
used. This can be likened to the process of epistemic dominations in society like the process of epistemic 
colonisation. The resistance against this domination is what much of the literature on epistemic injustice 
is about. However, there are instances where this domination faces no resistance. Rather, it is faced with 
a frantic effort by the dominated to try to fit into the system of dominance. Instances like this can be 
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seen clearly in the processes of epistemic colonisation10. If we are to understand epistemic colonisation 
as a process that involves the following three stages, it becomes clearer how epistemic systems with 
foundational epistemic problems are formed. These stages are a) disregard of existing epistemic 
frameworks in the colonies, b) the imposition of the coloniser’s epistemic frameworks, and c) the 
formation of a new epistemic framework on the colonised.11 
When a process that involves these three stages to varying degrees is the foundation of our epistemic 
system, then we have a foundational epistemic problem. Epistemic systems with this sort of foundational 
issues become breeding grounds for appreciative silencing, since they are, for the most part, impervious 
to meaningful resistance. This is because, with time, epistemic systems develop resilience to external 
influences that try to disrupt them. So, if we have an epistemic system that is built on oppressive 
ideologies, and this system has developed over time, the hermeneutical and general epistemic resources 
available to this system make it easy for it to resist an external force.  
Think of it in terms of world universities ranking for instance. The older universities are generally ranked 
better than the newer ones. This is because, over time, the older universities have developed to such an 
extent that it is not easy for the newer ones to be considered superior to them. This does not necessarily 
mean that the older universities are better than the newer ones. 
What I aim to get at is the point that at times, epistemic systems build their resilience not necessarily due 
to its superiority but just because of how old they are. As I have mentioned already in the previous 
 
10 While I use colonialism as my example here, the formation of hegemonic intuitions that can lead to appreciative 
silencing is also applicable to other instances of oppression. What ties them together is the historically, dominantly, 
and oppressively situated foundations of these intuitions. We can think of ideas around patriarchy and 
heteronormativity, for instance, that hold these features. These ideas (colonialism, patriarchy, heteronormativity) 
for the most parts have faced a fair deal of resistance. However, these oppressive systems have created some 
intuitions in the society that remain hegemonic. This is evident in the struggle of former colonies to try and fit into 
‘the’ norms of society. Or when male standards are set as the norm that women are expected to attain. 
11 See also Tobi (2020). 
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chapter, this is not necessarily a bad thing. However, if that epistemic system was built on, and influenced 
by, oppressive social ideologies, we are stuck with a very resilient and oppressive epistemic system. When 
we have a highly resilient but oppressive epistemic system, it becomes difficult for members of socially 
marginalised groups within that oppressive epistemic system to make sense of their oppression. This 
epistemic system becomes the shared norms and understanding that exists within a given society by which 
the society understands itself and is guided.  
As I have hopefully shown, in oppressive situations, these epistemic systems have a foundational 
epistemic problem. When an epistemic framework that has a foundational epistemic problem is resilient 
towards external forces that aim to change it, it does not only ensure its sustenance, but also the 
sustenance of that oppressive power structure. When an epistemic system with a foundational epistemic 
issue is resilient and becomes hegemonic, the oppression embedded in the epistemic system gets 
internalised by the oppressed. This kind of internalised oppression that leads to an acceptance and 
normalisation of oppressive situations is what is responsible for appreciative silencing. As a way of 
speaking, you can say the oppressed have been brainwashed. This brainwashing ensures that the 
oppressed views the oppressor as the paradigm of progress and civility. So, rather than create or stick to 
their ways, they are caught in a frantic drive to try to be like the ‘master’. 
In this drive to be like the ‘master’, members of oppressed groups form or adapt to a new epistemic 
system. This epistemic system in most cases (like in The Farmers and Miners Analogy) is the epistemic 
system of the oppressor. One of the problems with this is that more often than not, these epistemic 
systems are of the nature that sustains the undue superiority of those it belongs to by creating the wrong 
kind of resilience against any idea that threatens it. 
2.5.2. Silencing that Elicits Appreciation 
I hope, at this stage, that I have shown how an epistemic system with foundational epistemic problems 
can be accepted by those whom it oppresses. This is a crucial element of appreciative silencing. If this 
problematic epistemic system offers the oppressed any semblance of success, we can imagine the 
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oppressed being grateful to the oppressive system. Recall The Grateful Graduate* from section 2.3 
above. We see there that Peter is appreciative to a system that is oppressive to him. This dimension of 
that example is what I aimed to make clearer with the last two sections. The core element to it is an 
epistemic system with foundational epistemic problems that have become hegemonic to the oppressed. 
This is what makes appreciation possible. This case with Peter represents more straightforward cases of 
appreciative silencing where the hegemonic status of the oppressive epistemic system is sufficient to 
make the victims of oppression appreciative.  
A more complex case of appreciative silencing requires that the resilience of the oppressive epistemic 
system comes into play. For example, when a black person complains that black people are being 
disproportionately targeted by the police, and the response they get are statistics that show that white 
people are also being targeted by police – or legal explanations for why the treatment that black people 
receive is justified, the resilience of an epistemic framework is at play. Firstly, the epistemic framework is 
the one that considers these statistics and legal injunctions to have superior epistemic power to the claims 
of injustice by the black person. Secondly, what this resilience does is that it sustains a system that one 
group considers to be oppressive to them. Considering that the bulk of the legal systems in most countries 
existed prior to the abolition of some oppressive systems and that these oppressive systems (apartheid, 
Jim Crow law, colonialism), were (and in some cases are still legal, anti-gay laws for instance) legal, it 
makes sense to take the leap that these laws are not in the interest of the oppressed in the first instance. 
This point was made as far back as the 1960s by Stokely Carmichael when he argued against the idea of 
integration. For Carmichael (1966b), integration meant that black people were being included in a white 
society. Apart from the problematic fact that this society was not made for the black person, integration 
also maintained the presupposition that everything white was good. 
Carmichael’s resistance here and the resistance shown by Amina in The Grateful Graduate* example 
represents the kind of response that is appropriate to oppressive situations and helps track these 
oppressive situations like I argued for in section 2.2 above. However, even when resistance like this is 
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shown, it is still possible for appreciative silencing to occur when the resilience of the oppressive 
epistemic system comes into play. Let me explain how.  
Like I have argued for previously, a feature of dominant oppressive epistemic system is that they offer, 
or at least promise ‘success’. In The Farmers and Miners Analogy, the success is in the eventual 
economic fruitfulness of mining. In The Grateful Graduate* example, Peter boasts of his success which 
he attributes to the oppressive epistemic system in which he finds himself. These ‘successes’, in a way, 
are grounds for considering these systems to be superior to their counterparts. They (the success) make 
these epistemic systems impervious to change – if they are proven to work, keep them. It is imaginable 
to think that after Amina tried to resist Peter’s claims about the superiority of the English language, Peter 
gave ‘good reasons’ why she is wrong. If Amina is to achieve any success epistemically (or even socially) 
within that system, she must accept Peter’s reasons. If she goes on to be ‘successful’, she, like Peter, will 
be appreciative of the system for the success it offers. This is possible because even though Amina resists 
initially, Peter’s epistemic system is resilient enough, and is hegemonic.  
This is another dimension to appreciative silencing, where there is a form of resistance, but the resistance 
gains no traction because the victim has the same hegemonic intuitions as their oppressor. In this case, 
the hegemonic intuition dictates what counts as success. I say more on this point in the next chapter 
where I talk about hegemonic intuitions in more detail. What is important to note at this stage is that the 
hegemonic intuitions of epistemic systems with foundational epistemic problems lead to appreciative 
silencing. The hegemonic intuition in The Farmers and Miners Analogy, for instance, is the longevity 
and success of mining over farming. What this success fails to take into account is the harm caused by 
mining on its way to the top. 
So far in this chapter, I have tried to show two things. The first is how anger is an appropriate response 
to epistemic injustice and an effective way to track it. The second is how the opposite emotion of 
appreciation can also be elicited from instances of epistemic injustice.  Now, let me elucidate in very 
particular terms what appreciative silencing is. 
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2.6. Appreciative Silencing 
Recall that I define appreciative silencing as a form of epistemic silencing where 1) the perpetrator relies 
on ill-formed hegemonic intuitions, 2) the victim does not exhibit a fit of resistant anger, or is unaware 
that they are a victim of an oppressive situation, and 3) the victim feels and possibly shows appreciation 
instead. I explain these elements of appreciative silencing in more detail in the rest of this section. 
By hegemonic intuitions, I mean those in-built standards of validation with which we judge what is 
properly epistemic within an epistemic system. That is, when we consider a particular epistemic system 
to be superior to another, we do this based on some prejudgment. This prejudgment is the intuition that 
guides us. It is not always the case that our intuitions are hegemonic. They can be affected by different 
factors like gender, race, sexuality, beliefs about religion, et cetera. In these cases, individuals can have 
intuitions that are shaped by the particular social group they find themselves. For instance, I can have the 
intuition that as a black person, I need to be consciously aware of my black body and navigate the world 
accordingly. This intuition is not hegemonic if the dominantly situated do not share it. An intuition 
becomes hegemonic when it is the intuition of the dominantly situated and holds a prominent place in 
the collective subconscious. Take, for instance, members of a sub-Saharan African community that 
advocate a system of consensual democracy over a majoritarian one. While this represents one aspect of 
their lives, the hegemonic intuition guiding them is the Ubuntu moral theory that promotes harmony 
over discord as the measure for right action (Metz 2007: 334). 
This is one instance where a hegemonic intuition is not harmful. Consider another hegemonic intuition 
that is commonly held with the aid of this popular riddle. A boy and his father are in an accident and 
rushed to the hospital. When they get there, the Doctor says about the boy, ‘I cannot treat him, he is my 
son’. Who is the doctor? The confusion this might bring, or the fact that it is a riddle in the first place 
points to a harmful hegemonic intuition we might hold. It is the intuition that Doctors are males. This is 
an example of an ill-formed hegemonic intuition. When intuitions of this kind are relied upon to silence 
another, it leads to an instance of appreciative silencing. This extends beyond obvious cases like this to 
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all cases where a hegemonic intuition is affected in some way by prejudicial stereotypes and cases where 
our validation of other epistemic systems is guided by prejudicial stereotypes. 
So, if I consider my epistemic system to be superior to another based on my prejudicial stereotypes about 
them, or if my epistemic system promotes prejudicial stereotypes about others, any hegemonic intuition 
I hold from it is ill-formed. Further, if I am a member of a socially dominant group, my (conscious or 
unconscious) imposition of this ill-formed hegemonic intuition on members of other social groups 
constitutes an epistemic injustice. One way to think of the epistemic injustice that happens here (especially 
when the imposition is unconscious) is in Dotson’s (2012) sense of ‘contributory injustice’. In what 
follows, I elucidate appreciative silencing by discussing the points of similarity and difference to 
contributory injustice. 
Recall that Dotson (2012: 31) defines contributory injustice as a form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance 
that maintains and utilises structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources to harm the epistemic agency 
of a knower due to ‘situated ignorance’. ‘Situated ignorance’, here, refers to a kind of ignorance that is an 
offshoot of one’s social situatedness, insofar as this social situatedness fosters close-mindedness to other 
epistemic and social realities. What Dotson shows here is that the situated ignorance of one group makes 
it possible for them to ignore whole parts of the world that they do not find relevant. This leads to the 
formation of prejudiced hermeneutical resources, which, in my terms, are the bedrock for ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions. Seeing that members of dominant groups that rely on these intuitions are, at the 
very least, culpable for their decisions to ignore whole parts of the world that they find irrelevant, it stands 
to reason that they can also be held culpable for the unconscious decisions they make as a result of their 
‘situated ignorance’. The point from Dotson’s (2012: 31) contributory injustice that is vital in thinking 
about the possible harm of unconscious actions and the culpability of its perpetrators is that there is no 
single set of hermeneutical resources that everyone depends on. Rather, there are pockets of 
hermeneutical resources that are relevant to, and available within each social group. Acting out of one of 
these, while neglecting the others, is what constitute contributory injustice. 
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In this sense, appreciative silencing involves a form of contributory injustice broadly construed. However, 
the second feature of appreciative silencing distinguishes it from contributory injustice. In Dotson’s 
(2012: 32) analysis of contributory injustice, the victim tries to resist the injustice. In contrast, the victims 
of appreciative silencing neither show nor feel resistance. Even in cases where they show resistance, the 
resilience of the oppressive epistemic system is sufficient to convince the oppressed that their resistance 
is unwarranted. This is a crucial point where appreciative silencing differs, not just from contributory 
injustice, but from other forms of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and epistemic oppression.  
Recall that anger is an appropriate response to injustice, and in cases of epistemic injustice, it is a resistant 
anger that acts as a catalyst to form resistant knowledge. This resistant anger has been a way of identifying 
instances of epistemic injustice. However, this feature is not present in appreciative silencing. This is 
because of the processes that are responsible for this injustice. Recall in The Farmers and Miners 
Analogy, the harms and wrongs of the injustices here are disguised as good deeds in the colonial context 
and other similar practices. In cases where they are not disguised as good deeds, they are presented as 
‘rational’ alternatives that ultimately silences the victims of this injustice.  
Take, for instance, the case of Peter and Amina from The Grateful Graduate*. Since Amina shares 
similar hegemonic intuitions as Peter, Peter can effectively silence Amina by appealing to their shared 
intuition on what counts as success. Just to clarify, it is not that Amina is unaware of what is happening 
to her when she complains (if she has the same hegemonic intuitions as Peter). She knows something is 
wrong. However, by subscribing to the same hegemonic intuition about what counts as success as Peter, 
she is a victim of an ill-formed hegemonic intuition. What makes this a case of appreciative silencing is 
that Amina accepts this hegemonic intuition to be the case. If she does not accept this hegemonic intuition 
but pushes back against it actively, or doubts its implications secretly, it will be a case of ‘epistemic 
gaslighting’12. 
 
12 I do not talk about epistemic gaslighting here, as it is not within the scope of my dissertation. See Stark (2019) 
for an account of epistemic gaslighting. 
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The final (and perhaps the most harmful) element central to appreciative silencing is that the victims are 
appreciative of the systems that harm them. This appreciation comes through when the victim of the 
epistemic harm thanks the system directly or indirectly, thereby ending all epistemic engagements. In The 
Grateful Graduate*, if Amina thanks Peter or the epistemic system, that will probably be the end of the 
conversation. The danger here is that Amina does not see herself as a victim but as someone who has 
been helped. Whatever knowledge would have been gotten from her pushback will be lost. This loss is 
not caused simply by some sort of systematic erasure but also by the victim’s blindness to their situation. 
It is of the nature of the blindness created here that the victims become believable agents of injustice. That is, 
by accepting and being appreciative of this injustice, the victims become agents of this injustice by 
subscribing to the ill-formed hegemonic intuition. By their membership in the social group that suffers 
this injustice, they are given higher credibility when they talk about issues affecting their social group. 
However, because of the ill-formed hegemonic intuition that they hold, their contributions about their 
social group would be ones that are deleterious to their social group itself. This creates a difficult situation 
where the creation and spread of ignorance have the exact characteristics, and even seem more credible 
than the creation and spread of knowledge. So, Amina, like Peter, is more likely to be believed when she 
says the epistemic system of the colonised holds degrees of intelligibility that her epistemic system lacks.  
Instances of this happening can be seen in marginalised people’s efforts to sound, look and act in a certain 
way that is considered ‘smart’, ‘civilised’, ‘normal’, or ‘acceptable’. These ways are usually the ways of the 
socially dominant groups and these recommendations, in themselves hold no epistemic value.  
2.7. Where is the Harm in Appreciative Silencing? 
A recap is in order at this point. I started by looking at various kinds of epistemic injustice, epistemic 
violence, and epistemic oppression. I identified the salient feature of these epistemic bad practices to be 
that they lead to distinctly epistemic harms. I homed in on silencing as the harm that occurs across the 
board. Looking at different conceptions of silencing, I identified anger as the emotion that silencing 
appropriately elicits. I used Bailey’s (2018) analysis to show that anger is an appropriate response to 
injustice, tracks injustice, and creates resistant knowledge. I then considered the possibility of silencing 
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without the appropriate response of anger from the victim. I argued for this breed of silencing as an 
appreciative silencing that is caused by reliance on ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. From my argument 
for this, it is, hopefully, clear how these ill-formed hegemonic intuitions constitute an epistemic wrong 
(which I will say more on in the next chapter). But where exactly is the harm when someone is silenced 
in this manner? 
I submit that the primary harm of appreciative silencing is to the collective knowledge economy and the 
secondary harm is to the victim. There are some caveats to this that I make clearer in the final chapter of 
this thesis. But for now, let me focus on the harm in rough, drawing on the victim’s reliance on ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions and her neglect of other hermeneutical resources. The reliance on ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions ensures that the dominant epistemic position flexes its resilience in such a way that 
it pushes back against any system threatening position. What this ensures is that what is accepted in, or 
remains of, the collective ‘social imaginary’ (Medina’s term 2011: 28) are intuitions and ideas that sustain 
the undue advantage of dominantly situated knowers. This sustenance leads to the neglect of 
hermeneutical resources that come from the marginally situated knowers. This is mainly because while 
dominantly situated knowledge has a higher chance of being resilient, marginally situated knowledge does 
not.  
Take, for instance, the dominant situatedness of Western medicine vs the marginal situatedness of 
medical practices from the global South. Western medicine has a higher resilience for many reasons, some 
good, some not so good. The good reasons could include its effectiveness, trust in it developed over 
time, the rigour of its methods, et cetera. To the extent that these factors are responsible for its 
sustenance, the resilience it has built is a good thing. However, if factors like social standing and 
stereotypes about the global South are also responsible for Western medicine’s higher resilience over 
medical practices from the global South, it is a bad thing. This is because the resilience here is no longer 
based solely on its epistemic merits and benefits, but also on biased and epistemically irrelevant factors.  
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When factors like these are responsible for the resilience of Western medical practices, this is an 
intrinsically bad thing. But the harm to the knowledge economy also has a relational dimension to it.13 That 
is, when we privilege Western medical practices, we do so at the expense of medical practices from the 
global South. Hence, our reliance on a perniciously formed epistemic system and the dominance this 
system has leads to the unwarranted erosion and potential loss of knowledge that we could have otherwise 
had. To the extent that bad epistemic practices and intuitions are bad for epistemology itself, the primary 
harm of appreciative silencing is to the knowledge economy. 
The secondary harm of appreciative silencing which is done to the epistemic agent here is the topic of 
most debates on agential epistemic injustices when a person is harmed in their capacity as a knower. Just 
as in other instances of silencing identified in the literature, appreciative silencing involves a breakdown 
in communicative reciprocity broadly construed. This is because when an agent suffers appreciative 
silencing, they fail to participate adequately in the knowledge economy. Instead, they are made to operate 
from, and be appreciative of, systems that are oppressive to them. These ill-treatments that victims of 
appreciative silencing suffer as epistemic agents are what I consider to be the secondary harm of 
appreciative silencing.  
The main reason why I consider this harm to the epistemic agent to be secondary is that it is caused, in 
most instances, by the harm to the knowledge economy. That is, the gap already created in the knowledge 
economy is what enables victims of appreciative silencing to keep being silenced. Since appreciative 
silencing relies on already accepted hegemonic intuitions, these intuitions that represent the gap in the 
knowledge economy are what is responsible for the harms that victims of appreciative silencing 
experience in their capacity as knowers. Just to clarify, when I consider the harm to the knowledge 
economy to be the primary harm and the harm to the epistemic agent to be the secondary harm, I do not 
in any way mean to suggest that the harm done to the knowledge economy is superior to, or more 
 
13 Thanks to Gaile Pohlhaus for making me see this additional dimension. 
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important than the harm done to the agent, and vice versa. My reason for classifying them in this way is 
what I have just mentioned. 
Appreciative silencing enables a form of epistemic injustice that is similar to Dotson’s third-order 
epistemic exclusion. This is what I discuss in the next chapter. But for now, recall that third-order 
epistemic exclusion is a form of epistemic oppression that is irreducible to social oppression. It is a form 
of epistemic oppression that ‘follows from a feature of epistemological systems themselves [and can only] 
…be addressed through recognition of the limits of one’s overall epistemological frameworks’ (2014: 
116). To the extent that appreciative silencing a) flows from ill-formed hegemonic intuitions and the 
resilience of dominant epistemologies and b) can only be addressed by recognising the limits of one’s 
epistemological framework, the injustice associated with it fits into Dotson’s third-order epistemic 
exclusion. 
As an irreducible form of epistemic oppression, the difference between third-order epistemic exclusion 
and other reducible forms of epistemic oppression ‘concerns the character of the resistance to change or, in other 
words, differing causes of inertia’ (Dotson 2014: 117, author’s emphasis). That is, the difference concerns how 
much change is needed to an epistemic system to address the oppression. Reducible forms of epistemic 
oppression will, for instance, require a new understanding of the current epistemic system or similar 
minimal change. Irreducible forms of epistemic oppression, however, will require a change to key 
operating elements of an epistemic system or a recognition that such epistemic system is inadequate. I 
discuss this point in more detail in the next chapter. 
2.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have unpacked some of the intricate nuances of various accounts of silencing in the 
literature. The salient feature of these accounts of silencing which I considered is that these forms of 
silencing elicit the emotional response of anger from its victims. This is an appropriate response to the 
epistemic injustices they face, and it is an effective way to track instances of these epistemic injustices. 
However, I proposed the counterintuition that it is possible for someone to be a victim of epistemic 
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injustice and rather than show the angry response we have come to expect from instances like this, they 
show the opposite response of appreciation.  
I argued that cases like these are instances of appreciative silencing. What makes appreciative silencing 
possible is that there is usually a foundational epistemic problem with epistemic systems where 
appreciative silencing occurs and this makes its victims accept and operate based on hegemonic intuitions 
that are oppressive to them. When people are silenced in this way, they are victims of epistemic injustice. 
But what specific form of epistemic injustice does instances of appreciative silencing track? I intend to 




‘For a real end to exclusion in… society that society would have to be so radically changed that the goal cannot really be 
defined as inclusion’ (Carmichael 1966a). 
3.1. Hegemonic Injustice as a Variety of Epistemic Injustice 
So far, I have argued for the phenomenon of appreciative silencing as a form of epistemic silencing that 
arises when instances of epistemic injustice, epistemic violence, and epistemic oppression do not elicit an 
angry response but an appreciative response from the victims of these epistemic bad practices. In addition 
to the non-angry response that signals appreciative silencing, there is also appreciation to the unjust 
system by the victims, that could lead to the victims becoming accomplices to the injustice that they 
suffer. All these are possible since the victims of appreciative silencing subscribe to the ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions of the system that oppresses them. In the process that leads to the formation of 
these intuitions (colonialism for instance), we can see various forms of epistemic and social injustices at 
play. However, we get the intuition from appreciative silencing that there is something else going on 
when these victims internalise and perpetuate injustices against themselves. The question becomes: how 
do we understand instances where the victims of epistemic injustice are also victims of historical systems 
of self-devaluation that makes them perversely appreciative of the harms they face? 
I argue for a new form of epistemic injustice that makes sense of instances like this. I tag it hegemonic 
injustice. This is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when the oppressed in a given system accept 
the ill-formed intuitions that have become hegemonic to their mind. It has the unique attribute where 
victims of epistemic injustices become accomplices to their oppression through the process of 
appreciative silencing. With most of the existing forms of epistemic injustice, the focus has been on how 
social injustices have an epistemic dimension. Broadly construed, hegemonic injustice has the same focus. 
However, the particular focus of hegemonic injustice is on how hegemonic intuitions lead to hegemonic 
injustice – a distinct form of epistemic injustice that can be tracked through the phenomenon of 
appreciative silencing.  
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I have elucidated how appreciative silencing can come about in a process like colonialism, in the previous 
chapter. I take it that the injustices there are easier to see because of the now obvious wrongs and harms 
of colonialism. This is uncontroversial. Where the epistemic wrongs and harms lie in my analysis is in the 
use of ill-formed hegemonic intuitions by the victims of these oppressive systems. These ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions that are at the core of appreciative silencing are also at the core of hegemonic 
injustice. I hope to make these points clear by the end of this chapter. 
I start by looking at how hegemonic injustice can be tracked in communicative exchanges through the 
phenomenon of appreciative silencing. This is generally possible when in cases of appreciative silencing, 
an ill-formed hegemonic intuition is relied upon to silence an agent. The presence of ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions is the crucial point of intersection between appreciative silencing and hegemonic 
injustice. My second step is to try and say, in more detail, what I mean by ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. 
I do this by explaining those kinds of intuitions that are not hegemonic, those hegemonic intuitions that 
are not ill-formed, and finally, those hegemonic intuitions that are ill-formed.  
In this final case of ill-formed hegemonic intuitions, I identify the obvious and the less-obvious cases of 
ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. The less-obvious cases are more intricate and difficult to spot. Hence, I 
situate my argument here in the pragmatic and moral encroachment literature. What I hope to have 
shown by the end of this chapter is what hegemonic injustice is, the phenomenon that can help us track 
it, and why its foundational cause (ill-formed hegemonic intuitions) is problematic. 
3.2. Hegemonic Injustice in Communicative Exchange  
When appreciative silencing is present in communicative exchanges, there is a disproportionate 
distribution of credibility. On the one hand, the utterances of the marginalised are given less credibility 
because it is disruptive to the accepted epistemic norms. On the other hand, the resilience of the 
hegemonic epistemic system ensures that another agent gets higher credibility. In both cases of 
appreciative silencing, the excess and the deficit are not recognisable as such. This is because 
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communications that allow for appreciative silencing occur within a hegemonic ‘epistemic terrain’14 and 
are hence not recognisable as containing instances of deficit or excess. Rather, these instances of 
credibility deficit and excess are seen as instances of wrong and right testimony respectively. To make my 
argument for how this happens, I highlight two distinguishing features of appreciative silencing whose 
occurrence in communicative exchanges gives us a way to track instances of hegemonic injustice. These 
features are not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, they serve to point out two crucial ways that instances 
of hegemonic injustice are recognisable in communicative exchanges when we focus on the appreciative 
silencing happening in those instances. These two features are: 
(3.2.1) The presence of an epistemic home terrain for some and away terrain for others. 
(3.2.2) A form of ‘resistance’ that helps preserve the epistemic home terrain. 
3.2.1. Epistemic Home Terrain 
Sandra Harding (1986) describes standpoint theory as offering an account of the various knowledge and 
ignorance patterns created by political relations. In this political relation, the dominant groups are 
responsible for the policies that validate which activities and interests are deemed reasonable (Potter 
2006: 132-133). As a result of that, competing conceptual frameworks that arise from socially 
marginalised groups are devalued. Standpoint theory importantly highlights the perspectival differences 
stemming from social location, embodiment, emotions, attitude, interests, values, cognitive styles, beliefs, 
and world view thereby, grounding epistemology on social theory. This provides a means for 
understanding group discourse by recognising that individual perspectives are created by experiences in 
social groups and regarding these individual perspectives as a valuable epistemic foundation. 
Considering how knowledge is shaped by the knower’s social situatedness, the unlevelled playing field 
societally translates into an unlevelled playing field epistemically.  This produces a situation of advantages 
for some epistemic agents and disadvantages for others. The advantages and disadvantages here range 
 
14 I employ Alison Bailey’s (2017) use of this term which I explain shortly. 
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from the availability of epistemic resources to the credibility given to epistemic positions and agents. The 
disadvantage that stems from the lack of credibility given to some lead to an over-credibility for others.15 
The discourse formed by the over-credibility of some becomes the dominant discourse. As the dominant 
discourse, the epistemic positions of the dominant groups gain a hegemonic status. 
However, it is not always the case that the perspectival influence on knowledge formation is 
acknowledged – especially in dominant discourse. The denial of this perspectival influence on knowledge 
formation is what allows for the knowledge formed by dominant social groups to be passed off as 
objective knowledge that represents all of humanity. This, in turn, leads to the hegemonic status that 
these one-sided knowledge systems attain. The refusal to admit the perspectival influence on knowledge 
formation, combined with the hegemonic status of one-sided knowledge, lead to a situation where 
everyone in society is expected to engage with the dominant discourse to the same degree and in the 
same language (both literally and figuratively). This expectation represents an advantage for members of 
the socially dominant groups and a disadvantage for members of the socially marginalised groups. The 
advantage for the socially dominant group stems from the fact that the epistemic tools and resources are 
available and familiar to them while the reverse is the case for socially marginalised groups.  
The asymmetric epistemic resources within this space – to use a sporting analogy – means that one group 
has the home advantage while the other group playing away is disadvantaged. These dominant and 
advantageous-to-some epistemic practices and spaces represent what Alison Bailey (2017) refers to as 
‘epistemic home terrain’ in her analysis of ‘privilege-preserving epistemic pushback’. Epistemic home 
terrain refers to an epistemic space of privilege where certain groups (or individuals) engage in discourses 
 
15 I appreciate that this is not a generally accepted way of understanding the credibility economy. Fricker (2007: 
21) argues that credibility is not a limited resource so its distribution should not be understood in terms of 
distributary justice. Like Medina, I offer a qualified acceptance of Fricker’s view. I align with Medina (2011: 20) 
who argues that even though credibility is not a limited resource, its distribution should be understood as a matter 
of proportionality where due to social conditions of privilege and underprivilege, excess credibility to one person 
leads to limited credibility to another. I have mentioned this in chapter one but say more on it in the next chapter. 
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in terms that are available, familiar, and advantageous to them thus creating an advantage for members 
of these groups over others. This home terrain for some becomes a place of disadvantage for others who 
do not belong to this epistemic group. 
The home terrain, from my analysis of appreciative silencing, is crystallised in the ill-formed hegemonic 
intuition that is beneficial to some and oppressive to others. It is, ultimately, also the epistemic system 
that these ill-formed hegemonic intuitions validate as legitimate areas for epistemic concern. For example, 
if I am in a community that holds the intuition that the law should be applied irrespective of the 
peculiarities of each case, I could be oppressed if the laws are not beneficial to my specific situatedness. 
My oppressors in that community can justify my oppression by citing the law as a reason for what 
happens to me. It is in the nature of appreciative silencing that I also subscribe to this intuition that 
prioritises the law over the possible oppression that I might face due to my peculiar situation. When we 
work based on intuitions like this, we create an automatic space of disadvantage for the marginalised, 
while the dominantly situated are well placed to enjoy the advantages of this system. As a way of speaking, 
they have the home advantage while I do not. When I talked about foundational epistemic problems in 
the previous chapter, it is in reference to situations like this. 
If I am engaged in a communicative exchange within a framework that has this sort of foundational 
epistemic problem, the system is inherently disadvantageous to me. However, the hegemonic status of 
this system means that I accept it and internalise it. When it is internalised, I do not see anything wrong 
with this system. Instead, I will be appreciative of the ‘successes’ that this system promises me.  
This sort of occurrence, I have hopefully established so far, is an instance of appreciative silencing. When 
this phenomenon happens to me, I am a victim of hegemonic injustice. This is because I accept an 
epistemic system that is guided by intuitions that are foundationally problematic and oppressive to me. 
Instances like this are more straightforward cases of appreciative silencing that tracks hegemonic injustice. 
I had mentioned in the previous chapter (2.4.2) that in some cases of appreciative silencing, the resilience 
and promise of success of an epistemic system comes into play. These are more complex cases. In 
complex cases like this, the resilience and promise of success of an epistemic system act as a catalyst for 
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resistance against anyone or idea that threatens to disrupt the hegemonic position of the oppressive 
epistemic system. 
3.2.2. Resistance 
Once this home advantage has been created, there is the need to sustain it. This is done by a form of 
resistance very similar to Bailey’s (2017) ‘privilege-preserving epistemic pushback’. Bailey (2017: 879) 
defines this kind of epistemic pushback as ‘a form of worldview protection: a willful resistance to knowing 
that occurs predictably in discussions that threaten a social group’s epistemic home terrain’. On Bailey’s 
construal, this resistance is an active effort to protect one’s worldview. While this resistance can come in 
very brute forms (like outright refusal to listen or engage in conversation), it is mostly concealed in some 
sort of appeal to disciplinary tools (like logic, or objectivity of the scientific method, et cetera). Privilege-
preserving epistemic pushback can, thus, be seen as a form of willful ignorance, like Pohlhaus’ (2012) 
idea of willful hermeneutical ignorance or Dotson’s notion of contributory injustice (2012) already 
discussed in the first chapter. 
However, what I am interested in is how resistance can occur without any wilful element to it. That is, a 
form of resistance that relies on epistemic tools that have become hegemonic and are thus, concealed or 
not necessarily conscious. Consider a slightly altered version of an example Bailey (2017) uses to show 
an instance of privilege-preserving epistemic pushback. 
The Clarifying Philosopher (my label): A white philosophy major, Jennifer, shares a story about 
a racist graffiti that uses the ‘n’ word in a class discussion about institutional racism. Jennifer says 
the actual ‘n’ word in her example and claims she is only mentioning rather than using it. It is 
suggested to Jennifer by a black classmate, Sheila, that due to the historical context of the ‘n’ word, 
she should consider not using it. Jennifer explains the use-mention distinction as a foundational 
distinction in analytic philosophy and states that she is mentioning it and not using it. (Now, my 
alteration). Sheila accepts this distinction and thanks Jennifer for pointing it out. A similar situation 
occurs in a different class and another black woman, Franka, protests the use of the ‘n’ word. This 
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time, Sheila ‘enlightens’ Franka on the use mention distinction. Franka accepts and thanks Sheila 
for pointing it out. 
From the arguments I have made so far, the progression that leads to hegemonic injustice, noticeable in 
the appreciative silencing of Sheila and Franka, can be seen in this communicative encounter. In other 
forms of epistemic injustice, the prejudicial stereotypes and lowered credibility given to the epistemic 
position of one social group is usually between agents of different socio-economic status. However, in 
this case, and other cases of hegemonic injustice, the socio-economic status of the agents is not as 
important. What is important is that one group or person refuses to grant the other the credibility they 
deserve, citing an epistemic position that has a hegemonic status as the reason. 
In Bailey’s version of the example, Jennifer is responsible for bringing up the use-mention distinction. 
When she does so, she enacts a form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance that resists engagement with the 
lived experience of the other. This resistance that arises from the epistemic and even social comfort that 
Jennifer gets by not engaging with the other is the kind of resistance or pushback we are used to from 
the literature. Bailey (2017) refers to this form of resistance as ‘privilege-preserving epistemic pushback’.16 
In my modification of the example, the dynamics are different. By being responsible for the pushback in 
the second instance, Sheila is not preserving any social privilege she has. Rather, she is preserving a 
specific epistemic home terrain which she is now a part of. Even if she is a black woman, she engages in 
this act of protecting the dominant epistemic position that is foreign to her. By subscribing to, and being 
in, this hegemonic epistemic terrain, Sheila is a victim hegemonic injustice. The dominant epistemic 
terrain in this situation is the use and belief in philosophy as a legitimate tool for reaching the truth. By 
citing a widely accepted philosophical distinction to justify Jennifer’s statement, what Sheila has done is 
maintain a harmful status quo and block further conversations that can bring about genuine epistemic 
 
16 The difference between other forms of willful ignorance (willful hermeneutical ignorance or contributory 
injustice for instance) and Bailey’s privilege preserving epistemic pushback is the use of what Bailey calls ‘shadow 
texts’ (the analytic philosophical distinction between use and mention in this instance) for epistemic pushbacks. 
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engagements. Her positionality as a black woman is also crucial for maintaining this harmful status quo. 
This is because in this case, as in other cases of hegemonic injustice, the socially marginalised group’s 
acceptance of hegemonic practices is one of the factors that veils the epistemic harms and wrongs of 
hegemonic injustice. 
The resistance here is of the sort that when the agent carries it out unknowingly, they do not necessarily 
gain from it personally. It is a resistance that relies on a dominant worldview to sustain a dominant 
worldview. It is, hence, not a necessary condition for the perpetrator of this kind of injustice to be 
dominantly placed in society. This is the unique nature of the resistance that happens with hegemonic 
injustice where a victim of the injustice can also simultaneously be a perpetrator. They can be a 
perpetrator of testimonial injustice, for instance. In The Clarifying Philosopher above, when Sheila, in 
the second instance, corrects Franka, she gives Franka’s testimony about the effects of the ‘n’ word on 
her less credibility. In the traditional cases of testimonial injustice, there is the element of limited 
credibility, but it is due to prejudicial stereotype. Hence, one might argue that both being black women, 
Sheila has no prejudicial stereotype against Franka. This might be the case. However, in this instance of 
appreciative silencing against Franka, Sheila subscribes to a hegemonic epistemic system that is prejudiced 
against black women. So, when Sheila relies on this epistemic system as her reason for giving Franka’s 
testimony less credibility, she (not necessarily consciously) is relying on some prejudicial stereotype to do 
this. Hence, the testimonial injustice against Franka by Sheila. The overall distinctly epistemic harm that 
happens in The Clarifying Philosopher example is the appreciative silencing of Sheila and Franka. 
When an agent is a victim of hegemonic injustice and experiences appreciative silencing, they do not keep 
silent out of resentment for any wrong or harm done to them. Rather, they keep silent out of a recognition 
of ‘expert’ testimony and how this is the objective way to go. Consider my alteration to The Clarifying 
Philosopher again. In this scenario, Franka is silenced from contributing to the conversation. One 
unique feature of the silencing here is that it is not consciously based on any prejudicial stereotype that 
Sheila has against people in Franka’s social group (as they are both black women). Another feature of 
Franka’s silence is that she is not angry for not getting the desired uptake, even though she is, in fact, not 
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getting the desired uptake. This is because her initial complaint is meant to elicit a response that leads to 
further conversations about her experiences as a black woman. Unlike in other conceptions of silencing, 
Franka does not recognise that the ideal uptake her comments deserve is not granted her in this context. 
Rather, the silencing that happens to Franka here is out of her coming to believe that she was ‘wrong’ 
not to understand the use-mention distinction. The silencing is caused by a reliance on a hegemonic 
intuition that blocks further conversations. What this leads Franka to do is show gratitude to Sheila for 
‘enlightening’ her. Franka, like Sheila, will perhaps move on and use this use-mention distinction to 
silence others. As a result of this, a harmful hegemonic intuition is sustained and distributed as knowledge. 
I have talked hegemonic intuitions in very general terms variously above. Let say what it means in more 
detail.  
3.3. Hegemonic Intuitions  
Recall that by hegemonic intuitions, I mean those in-built standards of validation with which we judge 
what is properly epistemic within an epistemic system. To put it in another way, this is the (not necessarily 
conscious) standard that guides our judgment of claims about correctness or wrongness. Thus, if I am 
more inclined to believe the story of a white person over the story of a black person, I do this based on 
an intuition about the truthfulness and competence of white people vs the truthfulness and competence 
of black people. The in-built nature of intuitions means that we are not always aware of them when we 
make judgements, but they are always an influencing force in our judgement. As I hinted in the previous 
chapter, it is not always the case that our intuitions are hegemonic. And even when they are, it is not 
always the case that they are a bad thing. Let me make these two points clearer. 
3.3.1. Non-Hegemonic Intuitions 
I can hold an intuition that is specific to my race, gender, religion, et cetera while living in a society with 
diverse tribes, races, genders, and religions. In these cases, individuals can have intuitions that are shaped 
by the particular social group in which they find themselves. The earlier example I gave was of the 
intuition that as a black person, I need to be consciously aware of my black body and navigate the world 
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accordingly. Another would be if I held a tribal intuition based on the belief that coming out of the house 
on Thursday evenings at full moon will lead to five years of misfortune. Based on this intuition, I can 
decide to frame my life in such a way that I do not have any outdoor activities on Thursday evenings. 
These two instances show how my life decisions can be influenced by race- and tribe-specific intuitions 
I hold. However, these intuitions are not hegemonic, in the way I use it, since there are those in my larger 
community who do not believe this to be the case. This is an instance where an intuition can be held 
without it being hegemonic. It can be argued that even in my examples, these intuitions are hegemonic 
within these particular social groups. I concede that. However, when I use hegemonic intuitions here, I 
use it in reference to those intuitions in a society that are a) the intuition of the dominantly situated and 
b) are held across various social groups in a given society. Hence, an intuition becomes hegemonic 
primarily when it is the intuition of the dominantly situated knowers and is widely accepted and holds a 
prominent place in the collective subconscious. 
3.3.2. Good Hegemonic Intuitions 
Take, for instance, the earlier mentioned sub-Saharan African intuition of Ubuntu. This represents a 
hegemonic intuition because the ideal of harmony over discord is something that can be found, for the 
most part, in such societies in sub-Sahara Africa and it cuts across different facets of their lives. Within 
the ethical space, there is the moral theory of Ubuntu. Within the political space, there is a preference for 
consensual democracy over majoritarian democracy. And within the epistemic space, there is a preference 
for the dialogical over the adversarial systems of knowledge formation. In all these facets of their lives, 
the intuition of harmony over discord is what is prevalent.  
When I talk about hegemonic intuitions, I mean it in this way. This is not to suggest that it is only a 
hegemonic intuition if every member of that community subscribes to it. This is not the case. What makes 
it a hegemonic intuition, on my account, is that it is the intuition of the dominantly situated knowers in 
a society and it is prevalent in that society and the society’s thinking and practices are substantially 
influenced by said intuition. While I cannot speak to how the sub-Saharan intuition of Ubuntu was 
formed, I can say, at least, that it represents an instance where a hegemonic intuition can be considered 
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as a ‘good hegemonic intuition’. It is, hopefully, obvious at this stage that these are not the kinds of 
hegemonic intuitions I am interested in. 
3.4. Ill-Formed Hegemonic Intuitions 
My interest is in ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. There are two cases of such intuitions. The first is the 
obvious case where such intuitions lead to obviously wrong or harmful consequences. The second is the 
less obvious case where the hegemonic intuitions are considered to be a) based on evidence, and/or b) 
beneficial to those whom they, in fact, harm. Let me explain both aspects of ill-formed hegemonic 
intuitions in more detail. 
3.4.1. The Obvious Cases of Ill-Formed Hegemonic Intuitions 
Recall the riddle I used in the previous chapter to show how a hegemonic intuition can wrong: A boy 
and his father are in an accident and rushed to the hospital. When they get there, the Doctor says about 
the boy, ‘I cannot treat him, he is my son’. Who is the doctor? The confusion this might bring, or the 
fact that it is a riddle in the first place points to a negative hegemonic intuition we might hold. It is the 
intuition that Doctors are males. When we hold such patriarchal intuition, we wrong women. This is a 
more obvious case of holding an intuition that can wrong another mainly because of the obvious wrongs 
associated with patriarchy.  
The same can be said of racially motivated intuitions that come through, for example, when there is a 
disproportionate excitement when a black person excels in an intellectual field than when a white person 
excels in the same. The racial intuition here is that blacks are unintelligent. In cases like this, it is also 
obvious how the hegemonic intuition held is wrong. Tracing the formation of these patriarchal or racist 
intuitions is a job for historical analysis. However, we know that these intuitions exist and are based on 
historical (and persistent) systems of oppression. Intuitions formed out of the happenings of these 
systems are an example of an ill-formed hegemonic intuition.  
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This also applies to positive ill-formed hegemonic intuition. For example, if I hold the intuition that Asian 
kids are good at maths, it is an ill-formed hegemonic intuition. This is because this intuition is as a result 
of a stereotype that can be harmful to members of a social group. An Asian kid, for instance, might be 
under-taught in class or graded more harshly than her peers because of the stereotype that they are good 
at maths. When intuitions of this kind are relied upon to silence another, or to be epistemically unjust to 
another, it is an instance of harmful epistemic practice. This extends beyond obvious cases like this to all 
cases where a hegemonic intuition is affected in some way by prejudicial stereotypes and cases where our 
validation of other epistemic systems is guided by prejudicial stereotypes 
3.4.2. The Less-Obvious Cases of Ill-Formed Hegemonic Intuitions 
For the second, less obvious, cases where these ill-formed hegemonic intuitions are a) considered to be 
based on evidence, or b) beneficial to those whom they harm, the analysis gets more intricate. Let me 
build up the details of this slowly. 
If a society holds the hegemonic intuition that as a black man I am more likely to steal than a white man 
is, and this intuition is based on statistical evidence that shows black men stealing at a disproportionate 
rate to members of other racial groups in that society, it almost seems justified to hold that intuition. 
Nothing I have said about ill-formed hegemonic intuitions so far serves as enough evidence to consider 
this to be an ill-formed hegemonic intuition. This is mainly because I have defined hegemonic intuitions 
as in-built standards of validation held by the dominantly situated that are generally accepted as standards 
with which we judge what is properly epistemic within an epistemic system. Ill-formed hegemonic 
intuitions are those that employ prejudicial stereotypes. Based on this, it could be argued that hegemonic 
intuitions are justified if they are based on actual evidence. Statistical evidence is, after all, typically 
considered to be excellent evidence.  
So, if we consider the example from the riddle above, we can argue that holding that kind of intuition 
(that doctors are males) is based on statistical evidence about the demographics of medical doctors. 
Hence, in this case, and in the case where statistical evidence shows that black men are more likely to 
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steal in a particular society, the prejudicial stereotype guiding the hegemonic intuitions are not apparent. 
This makes the wrongs and harms in holding these intuitions obscure. To make these wrongs and harms 
obvious, it is important that I answer the question: what goes into the formation of a hegemonic intuition 
for it to be considered as an ill-formed one? 
I have mentioned prejudicial stereotypes as an identifying element of ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. In 
the more obvious examples I have used already, these prejudicial stereotypes are clear to see. In cases 
where they are obscured, these prejudicial stereotypes are present in a more nuanced way, either 
enhancing or causing the hegemonic injustice in those situations. When they enhance hegemonic 
injustice, they act as reinforcing elements that lead to the internalisation of oppressive situations by 
members of socially marginalised groups. When they cause hegemonic injustice, they highlight a 
foundational epistemic problem17. 
3.4.2.1. Hegemonic Intuitions that Enhance Hegemonic Injustice 
Hegemonic intuitions enhance the situations that lead to hegemonic injustice. Recall that I have stated 
that appreciative silencing is a phenomenon that can track instances of hegemonic injustice. For 
appreciative silencing to be possible, there is an acceptance and internalisation of oppressive situations 
by the oppressed. This is what makes it possible for them to be appreciative of the oppressive conditions 
they find themselves. For this process of internalisation to happen, the oppressed are, to a large extent, 
made to accept the system that devalues them. Think of a phenomenon like internalised racism for 
instance. Processes like this are only possible when the oppressive situations are accepted either 
 
17 The argument I make for these points can be situated in the literature on Pragmatic and Moral Encroachment 
(Basu 2019, Basu & Schroeder 2019, Fritz 2017, 2020, Moss 2018, Pace 2011). The basic thesis of pragmatic 
encroachment is that considerations that are not paradigmatically epistemic can have a bearing on the justificatory 
status of an agent’s belief. A paradigmatically epistemic consideration, for instance, can be the evidence for a belief, 
or any other truth-related consideration, such as ‘My belief is inconsistent with my experience’. Considerations that 
are not paradigmatically epistemic can include ‘facts about what matters to the subject’ (Fritz 2017: 645). In cases 
of moral encroachment, ‘whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral considerations, 
including even moral considerations that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p’ (Fritz 2020: 3052). 
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consciously or unconsciously by members of the oppressed groups. It goes without saying that oppressive 
systems are only possible due to some societal classification that sees some as superior to others. 
When we create the intuition that black men in a certain community are more likely to steal, even when 
it is based on statistical evidence, we are beginning to create a harmful stereotype against all members of 
that social group. As it is with stereotypes in most cases, it is not entirely based on nothing. There might 
be evidence to support the stereotype – false or not. The problem with stereotypes then is that it leads 
to the negative categorisation of members of an entire group. When this happens, we create a harmful 
situation for all members of that group. So, for instance, if I go to that community where they believe 
that black men are more likely to steal, I will be treated differently because of the stereotype against black 
men in that community. If I am falsely accused of stealing in that community, my testimony that I am 
innocent will not be given the credibility it deserves because of the prejudicial stereotype against me. This 
sort of credibility deficit that I get due to prejudicial stereotypes against me is what leads to most of the 
forms of epistemic injustice in the literature. This is one dimension of the harms that stereotypes like this 
can lead to.  
The second dimension of harms that prejudicial stereotypes can lead to is my possible internalisation of 
these prejudicial stereotypes. This harm is directly related to appreciative silencing and hegemonic 
injustice. Take, for instance, the example above where statistical evidence is cited to support the 
hegemonic intuition that black men are more likely to steal in a given community. What intuitions like 
this do is internalise the idea that black men in that community are thieves. While it is backed by statistical 
evidence, the use of this statistical evidence to form a harmful and generalised intuition about a particular 
group leads to a situation where every member of that group become victims to this prejudicial 
stereotype.18 It then becomes hegemonic when these stereotypes are accepted across the board and lead 
to internalised racism from members of this racial group. So, if I am followed by a store clerk in a 
 




departmental store because of my racial group, or if I am disproportionately stopped and searched by the 
police because of my racial group and rather than being angry about the oppressive situation, I understand 
the perpetrator, I have internalised the intuition that members of my racial group are thieves. Hopefully, 
I have said enough so far, to show how this leads to, or is an instance of appreciative silencing. 
In either case, holding prejudicial stereotypes that lead to the formation of hegemonic intuition is wrong.  
As I had mentioned, hegemonic intuitions are the not necessarily conscious standards we have that 
inform our disposition to believe or doubt certain propositions. So, if we hold hegemonic intuitions that 
are possibly prejudicial or formed out of prejudicial stereotypes, irrespective of the evidence we have for 
those intuitions, we are more likely to form prejudicial beliefs. 
3.4.2.2. Hegemonic Intuitions that Cause Hegemonic Injustice 
In this second instance when ill-formed hegemonic intuitions cause hegemonic injustice, hegemonic 
intuitions highlight a foundational epistemic problem that makes an epistemic system prejudicial to some 
(the marginally situated), while being beneficial to others (the dominantly situated). This lop-sidedness of 
epistemic benefits serves as a way for the dominantly situated to effectively pushback against the 
marginally situated. With the example I used, the citing of statistical evidence, for instance, as a way to 
justify forming the belief that black men in a particular area are more likely to steal represents a reliance 
on a hegemonic intuition that privileges evidence of this kind over the possibility of potentially harming 
others. I have shown and discussed instances of this in more detail already. I want to focus now on more 
complex situations where the reliance on these lopsided intuitions is either not necessarily conscious or 
accepted due to its origin (expert testimony, for instance). Let me adapt an existing case to illustrate my 
point. 19 
 
19 This example was adapted from a real-life case. The actual case can be found on: 




The Helpful Doctor: In a past colonial state, say Nigeria, a patient, Nicki, a successful black 
female pharmacist visits her Doctor, Rose, also a successful black woman. During Nicki’s meeting 
with Rose, Nicki explains some of her symptoms to Rose. Nicki states that she feels a sudden 
rush of radiating pain in her lower back, chills, weakness from her neck down. She has already 
treated, she says, what she thought was a yeast infection in her vagina and notes that she had ‘vag 
strep’ once before. Rose does a quick examination on Nicki and concludes that what she has is 
the first pangs of flu and yeast infection. Nicki protests, noting that she has already taken 
medications for yeast infections (to no avail), it is past flu season, and she has never had those 
symptoms when she has had flu in the past. Rose responds that she has been doing this for years 
and knows what those symptoms mean. She writes a prescription for Nicki which Nicki takes 
and feels better. It turns out that in fact, what Nicki was suffering from was a streptococcal 
infection in her vagina. Fortunately for her, one of the drugs prescribed by Rose contained 
penicillin, which was the actual cure for her infection.  
It is very easy to imagine how the ending could have been less fortunate for the patient (which is what 
happens in the real-life case, where the patient dies). Before highlighting the ill-formed hegemonic 
intuition in this scenario, the choice of subjects in this example is deliberate. The doctor and patient both 
being black and female highlights that they are of the same social status. I acknowledge that there are 
cases of under-treatment of blacks and females but that does not come into play here. Further, it is 
important to note that both subjects are successful and knowledgeable of medical matters to varying 
degrees. The main difference between the two of them is Nicki is the patient and Rose is the doctor.   
In the above scenario, there is an obvious epistemic injustice. Nicki’s testimony is not given the credibility 
it deserves. The credibility deficit here is not due to any stereotypes that Rose has against Nicki as a 
person (as they are both medically knowledgeable, black and females). Moreover, given how everything 
ended, there was no moral harm done to Nicki as she was healed. The harm here, rather, is a distinctly 
epistemic one. It is an epistemic harm in the sense that a gap was created in the knowledge economy (of 
Nicki’s knowledge about herself and potentially useful knowledge about streptococcal infection). By 
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relying on her medical expertise to assert superiority over Nicki’s testimony, Rose relies on a hegemonic 
intuition. Let me explain this in more detail. 
Rose relies on the hegemonic intuition that privileges expert testimony over her testimony and 
experience. Her reliance on this intuition is because based on past evidence, the expert remedy is proven 
to work. Any analysis of reliance on evidence for the formation of hegemonic intuition I can do here will 
be similar to the one I did in the previous section; hence, I will refrain from doing that. However, I will 
highlight some distinct elements to this example. As with evidence, we take expert testimony to be a 
reliable way of forming beliefs. In this instance, relying on Rose’s medical expertise seems like a 
reasonable thing to do since it is proven to work. I do not find anything problematic with this view as is.  
However, if we are to consider other extenuating factors that give Rose’s medical expertise its position 
of superiority, the problem begins to emerge. For instance, Rose’s ‘superior’ medical practice exists in a 
society that has other medical systems (traditional medicine) that have some prejudicial stereotypes 
attached to them (of being witchcraft, for instance). The origin of this prejudicial stereotype can be traced 
back to the problematic encounter of Nicki and Rose’s society with colonialism. Over time, what was 
once acceptable to this society becomes unacceptable mainly because of the internalisation of the 
prejudicial stereotypes about their practices by members of this society.  
So, while this is not an indictment on expert testimony in any way, it serves to highlight that if the position 
of superiority we give to expert testimony is not based solely on their epistemic merits, they become 
problematic. When we hold intuitions like this across the board in society, we are perpetuating hegemonic 
injustice. The epistemic wrong in this context has nothing to do with the socio-economic status of both 
parties and Rose has nothing to gain (directly) from maintaining the hegemonic epistemic practice. This 
highlights a crucial distinction between the form of ‘resistance’ that occurs in instances of hegemonic 
injustice that I highlighted in section 3.2.2. The Resistance here is of the sort that when the agent carries 
it out unknowingly, they do not gain personally from it. It is a resistance that relies on a dominant 
worldview to sustain a dominant worldview. It is, hence, not a necessary condition for the perpetrator of 




In this chapter, I have tried to establish that hegemonic injustice is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. 
My first step was to show how hegemonic injustice can be tracked in communicative exchanges through 
the phenomenon of appreciative silencing. This is generally possible when in cases of appreciative 
silencing, an ill-formed hegemonic intuition is relied upon to silence an agent. The presence of ill-formed 
hegemonic intuition is the crucial point of intersection between appreciative silencing and hegemonic 
injustice. My second step was to try and say, in more detail, what I mean by ill-formed hegemonic 
intuitions. I did this by explaining those kinds of intuitions that are not hegemonic, those hegemonic 
intuitions that are not ill-formed, and finally, those hegemonic intuitions that are ill-formed. In this final 
case of ill-formed hegemonic intuitions, I identified the obvious and the less-obvious cases of ill-formed 
hegemonic intuitions. The less-obvious cases are more intricate and difficult to spot. Hence, I situated 
my argument here in the pragmatic and moral encroachment literature. What I hope to have shown so 
far in this chapter is what hegemonic injustice is, the phenomenon that can help us track it, and why its 




‘There is of course a purely epistemic harm done when prejudicial stereotypes distort credibility judgements: knowledge that 
would be passed on to a hearer is not received’ (Fricker 2007: 43). 
4.1. What is Epistemic About Hegemonic Injustice?  
A recap is necessary at this stage. I started with the aim of answering this question: how should we 
understand instances where the victims of epistemic injustice are also victims of historical systems of 
self-devaluation that make them perversely appreciative of the harms they face? This question is 
motivated by the intuition that it is possible to have a victim of epistemic injustice be appreciative of the 
harm they experience. This is counter-intuitive on the surface. It is even more so when you look at the 
debates available in the literature and find out that in most cases of epistemic injustice, a salient harm is 
silencing, and the reaction that this harm elicits from its victim is anger. 
Staying with the idea that a salient harm in most cases of epistemic injustice involves silencing, I have 
argued for a distinctive form of silencing that I tag appreciative silencing. Central to this form of silencing 
is that its victims are appreciative, rather than resentful for the harms they experience. This is possible 
because these victims of appreciative silencing subscribe to an ill-formed hegemonic intuition that 
normalises and internalises the oppression that they face. Instances of appreciative silencing are 
distinctive and necessary ways to track the phenomenon of hegemonic injustice. One of the primary 
features of hegemonic injustice is that it tracks injustices at a foundational level. This means that while 
we can notice instances of hegemonic injustice in communicative exchanges through appreciative 
silencing, it is primarily a third-order phenomenon. 
In this chapter, I aim to provide further clarity on the key features of hegemonic injustice. I start by 
arguing that it is a third-order phenomenon. I model my argument after Dotson’s (2014) argument for 
third-order epistemic exclusion. Taking the key features of third-order epistemic exclusion to be 
fundamental to third-order phenomena, I argue for how hegemonic injustice either has these features or 
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deviates from Dotson’s characterisation of these features. I ultimately end with a proposal for a remedy 
for hegemonic injustice.  
4.2. Hegemonic Injustice is a Third-Order Phenomenon 
One thing my argument so far has emphasised is that hegemonic injustice revolves around hegemonic 
intuitions. Another thing I have tried to show is that hegemonic injustice is capable of isolating epistemic 
harms and wrongs that occur in a more obscure manner than other forms of epistemic injustice can. That 
is, you can have a scenario where an agent participates actively in an epistemic community but is still a 
victim of hegemonic injustice. This is possible because, with hegemonic injustice, the problem is 
noticeable at a foundational level. That is, hegemonic injustice focuses on more prior concerns about 
how our epistemic systems are formed. At the stage where these epistemic systems are formed, it is 
possible to notice other forms of epistemic injustice. For example, in the kind of colonial cases I have 
considered so far (The Grateful Graduate for instance), we can see how the colonised are victims to 
some of the forms of epistemic injustice we have come to know from the literature.  
However, once it is past the initial stage of active colonisation and gets to the stage where even the 
oppressed now accept and internalise this oppressive system, it becomes difficult to see the epistemic 
injustices. These not-so-obvious epistemic injustices are the ones that hegemonic injustice seeks to 
capture through its focus on hegemonic intuitions. As with other forms of epistemic injustice, hegemonic 
injustice takes prejudicial stereotypes to be foundational to epistemic injustice. Hegemonic injustice is 
concerned with how biases form epistemic systems. It aims to address foundational and often neglected biases 
that form our epistemic systems – that is, our ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. 
The site of hegemonic injustice is thus, not simply in the actual epistemic practices themselves but in the 
superiorisation of one epistemic practice over another. Hence, identifying hegemonic injustice at a 
foundational level requires an answer to the question: what makes epistemic system A superior to 
epistemic system B (supposing, as we did earlier, that epistemic system A is the epistemic system of the 
colonisers and epistemic system B is the epistemic system of the colonised)?  
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An obvious answer could be that epistemic system A gets us closer to the truth than epistemic system B, 
or that epistemic system A is rational in a way that promises objectivity which epistemic system B lacks. 
I find this answer unproblematic if these and other similar distinctly epistemic reasons are our grounds 
for the superiorisation of one epistemic system over another. Something obvious, but not willingly 
admitted about the above answer, however, is that epistemic system A is usually the epistemic system of 
the socially dominant group. Taking this into account, two factors can make the superior status of 
epistemic system A problematic. The first is if the dominant situatedness of members of epistemic 
community A plays a role in the superiorisation of their epistemic system over epistemic system B. The 
second is if prejudicial stereotypes about, and the marginal situatedness of, members of epistemic 
community B play a role in the inferior status that their epistemic system occupies. The reason why these 
two factors make the superiority of epistemic system A problematic is that they are not epistemic grounds 
for superiority. Rather, they are oppressive social grounds.  
In cases where these two factors or other similarly pernicious factors are responsible for the superiority 
of an epistemic system, it is problematic. However, the social dominance of members of epistemic group 
A means their epistemic system dominates that of other groups in a way that is systemic and with time, 
becomes hegemonic to all. This is the point I make when I say in instances of hegemonic injustice, there 
is also a historical system of oppression. What this system of oppression does is that it combines its social 
domination with epistemic domination of the marginalised. When this oppressive system gets normalised, 
the standards of the oppressor become the standards by which everything is measured. This is where 
hegemonic injustice is located, in the superiorisation of one epistemic practice over the other not solely 
on epistemic grounds but for pernicious social, among other pervasive, reasons.  
Just to reiterate, by saying that the often-accepted epistemic systems (epistemic system A in this instance) 
are usually those of the socially dominant group, I do not mean to claim that all epistemic practices that 
arise from socially dominant groups involve hegemonic injustice. My claim rather is that if the conditions 
for the superior status of the epistemic system or practice of socially dominant groups over socially 
marginalised groups are not purely epistemic but are also influenced by pervasive factors such as 
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maintaining social positions of dominance, it is an instance of hegemonic injustice. Hence, an epistemic 
position is hegemonically unjust iff:  
a) it is the position of the dominantly situated and is accepted by all and considered to be 
superior to others and, 
b) the reason for its superiority and dominance are pernicious non-epistemic considerations 
like the socially superior status of those from whom this epistemic position arises, or prejudicial 
stereotypes about the marginally situated, among other such pervasive considerations. 
The socially superior status that members of dominant groups hold combined with the dominance of 
their epistemic practices means that structures in society will be guided by the hegemonic practices arising 
from these groups. Take the case of colonisation in a country like Nigeria, for instance. After the process 
of colonisation, the exit of the colonisers did not mean a change in the epistemic practices of Nigerians. 
This is because structures have been built in such a way that the epistemic practices of the colonisers are 
seen as superior, desirable, objective and irreplaceable. An alternate example of how these sorts of 
oppressive systems can be internalised by the oppressed is how in certain societies, a notion of feminine 
beauty is dominant and accepted by all. What is not obvious about the formation of these notions of 
feminine beauty is that they represent the heterosexual male’s notion of what feminine beauty should be.  
The sustenance of dominant epistemic practices is due to their hegemonic status.  Again, these epistemic 
practices constitute hegemonic injustice because their superiorisation over other practices is based on the 
social status of their proponents. Based on these social statuses, privileges and preference are given to 
certain epistemic practices in society. This doling out of privileges is primarily along the lines of social 
dominance of certain groups. As a result, socially marginalised group’s epistemic practices are neglected 
due to prejudicial stereotypes held against members of these groups. The historically persistent nature of 
these oppressive systems that lead to the formation of hegemonic intuitions means that hegemonic 
injustice is not simply a matter of personal vice. That is, it is a structural form of epistemic injustice. 
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The value of understanding hegemonic injustice as a structural form of epistemic injustice is that it avoids 
the trap of individualising responsibilities. It makes it apparent that change of individual ethical or 
epistemic flaws is insufficient for attending to hegemonic injustice. This is not to say a change of 
individual ethical and epistemic flaws are not valuable. To the extent that an agent is aware of the 
hegemonic nature of certain epistemic practices, they can actively refuse to participate in solidifying those 
practices. However, the hegemonic nature of epistemic practices that perpetuate hegemonic injustice 
means that they shape the way we see the world and understand our experiences of it in a way that is not 
necessarily transparent to us. These epistemic practices are so ingrained in society that they form the 
norms by which society is guided, hence their hegemonic nature. Understood in this light, hegemonic 
injustice is something that needs to be negotiated by every member of society – the marginalised and the 
dominant – either as acting out the role it prescribes, taking its assumptions for granted, or reinforcing it 
in social structures and institutions.  
The foundational and structural nature of hegemonic injustice is what makes it a third-order 
phenomenon. It has some similarities with some other third-order phenomena like Dotson’s (2014) third-
order epistemic exclusion which I discussed in detail in chapter one. Let me recap the central points that 
are of relevance at this stage. Three elements that are crucial to Dotson’s (2014: 116, 129) third-order 
epistemic exclusion are that:  
1. it is irreducible to social oppression,  
2. it follows from a feature of epistemological systems themselves,  
3. and the change that is required to remedy third-order epistemic exclusion is for the agents within 
an epistemic framework to look outside their current framework for alternative epistemic 
resources.  
Elements of hegemonic injustice are similar to these three elements of Dotson’s third-order epistemic 
exclusion – albeit in a nuanced way. I focus on these nuances in more detail shortly. For the moment, it 
is worth noting that hegemonic injustice is starkly different from third-order epistemic exclusion with 
regards to the victim’s reaction to this injustice. As with other cases of epistemic bad practices, the victims 
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of third-order epistemic exclusion are resistant to, and angry about, the ill-treatment they receive as 
epistemic agents. It is obvious in these cases that there is an infringement on the epistemic agency of the 
victim. However, in cases of hegemonic injustice, there is no obvious infringement on the epistemic 
agency of the victim since they are able to utilise the shared – albeit oppressive – epistemic resources.  
I hope that my analysis in the last two chapters has done enough to show how hegemonic injustice is 
distinct from other forms of epistemic bad practices (particularly third-order epistemic exclusion in this 
instance) hence, I will not dwell on this particular point of distinction further. Let me now turn to the 
nuances in the similarities that hegemonic injustice shares with Dotson’s third-order epistemic exclusion.  
4.3. Irreducible to Social Oppression  
Dotson (2014: 116) argues that third-order epistemic exclusion is irreducible to social oppression. What 
this simply means is that unlike first and second-order epistemic exclusion that generally follow from 
forms of social and political oppression, third order-epistemic exclusion stems from features of 
epistemological systems themselves (ibid). The main such feature is the resilience of an epistemological 
system. Epistemological resilience is the ‘resistance-to-disturbance’ of an epistemological system prior to 
the need for change or adaptation (Dotson 2014: 121). This resilience becomes a major source of inertia 
against recognising third-order epistemic exclusion (Dotson 2014: 132-133). Insofar as the resilience of 
an epistemological system is responsible for the oppressive nature of the system, the oppression is 
irreducible to social oppression on Dotson’s account. This is because epistemological resilience is an 
immediate feature of epistemic systems themselves (ibid). If, for example, I complain about police 
brutality as a black person and the response I get are statistics and legal backing to show that my 
complaints are unwarranted, the resilience of the dominant epistemic system is at play. The epistemic 
system here is the one that relies on these methods (statistics, laws, et cetera) as a way for justifying its 
claims to supposed superiority. The disturbance is my claim that something is wrong within this system. 




I have already talked about these features of Dotson’s third-order epistemic oppression in more detail in 
chapter 1, so I will not go into further detail here. What is important to note is that for Dotson, the 
irreducibility of third-order epistemic oppression is because the oppression follows from a feature of 
epistemological systems themselves – epistemic resilience. With hegemonic injustice, I argue that 
although social issues are at its core, it follows from a feature that has become epistemic. This feature is 
ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. I have talked about hegemonic intuitions in greater detail in the 
preceding chapters. Let me now turn to one way that social issues can lead to the formation of hegemonic 
intuitions that become a feature of an epistemic system. 
When we conceive of a society, some of the core characteristic features we think of are a shared 
understanding that has been developed over time within the society. This shared understanding forms 
the epistemic framework of each society and it informs the norms which guide the society. With time, 
this epistemic framework becomes hegemonic within a society and it a) gets internalised by most without 
question, b) becomes the cornerstone for future decisions, and c) any intuition that is informed by these 
hegemonic epistemic frameworks are accepted, or at the very least, seen as acceptable by most within a 
given society. These epistemic frameworks are not equally representative of every member or section of 
a given society. It informs, and simultaneously, is informed by the power structure in the society. Since 
in most societies, power structures accord privileges to some while oppressing others, the epistemic 
frameworks that are formed in these societies also employ these pervasive systems. This is one way of 
understanding how hegemonic intuitions are formed in societies. Also, think of the literature on epistemic 
injustice. It is mainly those who have been negatively impacted by systems such as racism, colonialism, 
patriarchy, heteronormativity, et cetera, that are victims of credibility deficits, while those who have 
benefited from these oppressive systems also benefit from credibility excess. 
The privileged and the oppressed in society have disproportionate access to resources and are mostly 
divided across economic lines. Within the epistemic space, they are granted disproportionate levels of 
credibility and are divided across the lines of credible vs untrustworthy epistemic agents. As is the case 
with material resources, when an epistemic agent experiences credibility excess, it is at the expense of 
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another. We do not offer credibility excess to an agent in insolation. For example, if I grant a white man 
excess credibility because of their race and maybe other factors like their tone of voice or how articulately 
they speak, I do this concurrently with the limited credibility I grant to someone who possesses the 
opposite characteristics. To put this another way, when we create epistemic standards that are socially 
influenced, or not equally accessible to everyone, we skew the credibility economy in favour of those who 
readily possess these markers or have these markers advantageously accessible to them. 
Fricker (2007: 19-20) argues against this way of understanding the credibility economy. For Fricker, the 
credibility excess we offer to an agent has no direct correlation with the credibility deficit that another 
receives. This is mainly because she employs an understanding of epistemic injustice that focuses solely 
on the specific moment of testimonial exchanges. As she argues, when we offer excess credibility to 
members of the ruling elite for example, they do not suffer testimonial injustice in that specific 
communicative exchange since they do not get sufficiently wronged (Fricker 2007: 21). At best, they 
might suffer a cumulative wrong over time due to the epistemic arrogance and ignorance they might 
develop as a result of the excess credibility they have been attributed. This excess credibility that they 
receive, on Fricker’s account, does not amount to credibility deficit to others since ‘credibility is not 
generally finite [and] …there is no analogous competitive demand to invite the distributive treatment’ 
(Fricker 2007: 20).  
Medina (2011) offers a qualified objection to Fricker’s position. He argues that while credibility is not a 
rare commodity like water, its distribution has a more complex nature than Fricker’s analysis provides. 
For Medina (2011: 20), it is an issue of proportionality where social conditions of privilege and 
underprivilege lead to the disproportionate distribution of credibility. On this view, an epistemic agent 
who enjoys credibility excess can develop epistemic vices like arrogance that lead directly to an instance 
of epistemic injustice towards another (Medina 2011: 17-18). For example, if I enjoy excess credibility 
due to my social standing, I develop an epistemic arrogance which makes me impervious to criticism. In 
cases like this, I will not give the deserved credibility to the testimony of anyone that voices an opinion 
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contrary to mine. Hence, my excess credibility in this instance is a direct cause of another’s credibility 
deficit. 
In line with Medina’s model, I argue that this disproportionate distribution of credibility that starts as 
purely social leads to the formation of hegemonic intuitions that become crucial parts of our epistemic 
systems. While this is broadly similar to the argument I made in the previous chapter on the formation 
of hegemonic intuitions, its specific focus here is on markers of credibility. Markers of credibility refer to 
features that inform our credibility judgements that are not necessarily epistemic features.  
As mentioned earlier (1.1.1), Goldberg (2013, 2015) argues for at least four elements that inform our 
credibility judgements. They include information about the speaker’s track record of saying true things, 
the speaker’s demeanour (confident or not), the hearer’s background knowledge about the topic, and the 
reputation of the speaker’s sources(ibid). These are what I term as markers for credibility. While most of 
these markers of credibility are socially influenced, I argue that the hegemonic nature they develop over 
time means they become a feature of our epistemic system. If the argument I make for this works, it will 
be made apparent how: 1) hegemonic injustice is irreducible to social forms of injustice, and 2) the 
problem is a feature of epistemology.  
4.3.1. Information about the Speaker’s Track Record of Saying True Things 
When we are presented with a claim, one of the things that determines the credibility we give to that 
claim is its source’s track record for asserting true claims. This statement is deliberately vague to 
accommodate claims made through a medium – like a journal or newspaper for instance. In cases where 
claims are made through a medium, the credibility we give to this claim based on its track record for 
saying true things is not an agential credibility per se. This is not the kind of case I am interested in – 
although it holds the potential for insightful discussions. I am interested in cases of communicative 
exchange, where an individual epistemic agent gives more or less credibility to the assertion of another 
individual agent based on the latter’s track record for saying true things. 
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When we listen to others, we expect them to say true things. If we have historical reasons (of them lying 
for instance) not to believe what someone says to us, it seems justifiable to give them less credibility. We 
want this element of trust in our communicative exchanges with others. Hence, granting diminished 
credibility to others based on their record of lying is epistemically justified. Call this claim X.  
Claim X, at face value, seems uncontroversial. However, if we are to consider how oppressive social 
conditions have continually labelled testimonies of members of certain social groups as lies, it becomes 
more complicated to take claim X to be uncontroversial. Take, for instance, the false belief that black 
people always lie about instances of police brutality. This belief is grounded on oppressive social 
conditions that seek to maintain an asymmetric power dynamic. If we are to take claim X to be the case, 
it makes sense to grant less credibility to the testimony of a black person when they talk about their 
experience of police brutality.  
Our epistemic norms prescribe that we take trust seriously when we grant credibility to an agent. But this 
is a situation where oppressive social conditions have wrongly framed an agent (black people in this 
instance) as untrustworthy. While the oppressive conditions that create this distrust are a social issue, 
their influence transcends social concerns. It creates a situation that makes it difficult for us to know 
credibly when we stick to our epistemic norms (claim X in this instance). If we are to remedy this 
situation, it is imperative that our epistemic norms are changed, or at the very least, tweaked to 
accommodate instances like this where social considerations can negatively impact our markers for 
credibility. 
4.3.2. The Speaker’s Demeanour 
I have experienced a recurring encounter between a friend of mine (a black Nigerian) and an older white 
man. For my friend, it is a cultural requirement that when you speak to an older person, you do not look 
them in the eyes, and you keep your head bowed the whole time. For this older white man, this is the 
demeanour of someone lying. For years, I watched this older white man treat my friend as if he was a 
liar, simply because he did not have the demeanour of a credible testifier according to his standards. 
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While a factor like a speaker’s demeanour is not essentially an epistemic consideration, it plays a role in 
the credibility we give to agents. When we listen to the testimony of others, it is not just their words that 
we pay attention to but how they say those words. (I would suppose this is what makes sarcasm, for 
instance, identifiable as such.) If an agent testifies in a way that we consider to be confident, our chances 
of believing them are higher.  
Think of two people in a debate. We are more likely to grant higher credibility to the speaker who is more 
articulate and bolder in asserting their claims. And we are more likely to grant lower credibility to the 
speaker who stutters or sounds unsure about the utterances they make. The same kind of dynamics 
applies to the kind of information the speaker provides. If a man spits out statistical evidence on how 
more men are victims of violence than women, and a woman speaks from a place of experience on the 
violence she has faced for being a woman, we are more likely to believe the man than the woman.  
As with trust in the previous marker of credibility I considered, we want to take certainty and rational 
reasoning to be crucial aspects of our epistemic lives. However, we see in these kinds of cases I have 
considered here that it disregards the cultural peculiarity of my friend and the experiential dimension of 
gender-based violence. In both cases, lower credibility is given to the testimony of an agent who should 
otherwise be afforded higher credibility simply because we have some markers for credibility that are 
exclusionary. 
4.3.3. The Hearer’s Background Knowledge about the Topic 
If I am a mathematician, and I hear someone make a false claim about a mathematical principle, my 
background knowledge about mathematics gives me enough reason not to trust them. If my knowledge 
on the details of World War II is vague, but I know for certain that it started in 1939  and someone makes 
the claim that during the second world war, Nigeria fought against Japan in 1936, my background 
knowledge gives me enough reason not to trust them. In the first instance, I know for certain that their 
claim about the mathematical principle is wrong. Here, my specific knowledge about the topic is 
responsible for my distrust. In the second instance, I do not know if Nigeria fought Japan or not but 
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from what I know about the start date of the second world war, I know there is no way their claim can 
be accurate. Here, my knowledge about historical events surrounding the topic is responsible for my 
distrust. I take it that it seems uncontroversial for me to grant less credibility to an epistemic agent on 
grounds like these. 
If a woman says it is unsafe to walk through street Z at 9:00 pm and I know I walk through street Z at 
9:00 pm daily, my particular knowledge about the safety of street Z seems like enough reason not to trust 
the woman’s testimony. If I say to a white colleague that all my friends struggle to get employment in 
South Africa after graduating but in my white colleague’s experience, all his friends get employed in South 
Africa immediately after graduating, my white colleague’s vague knowledge about the employment 
opportunity in South Africa seems like enough reason for him not to trust my testimony. These two cases 
are similar to the ones above. In the first two cases, the lessened credibility granted to the testifiers is 
justifiable when we consider the hearer’s varying background knowledge about the topics being discussed. 
In the second two cases, the lessened credibility is what the analysis on testimonial injustice is precisely 
about, even though the agents in these second cases have background knowledge about the topic being 
discussed. 
What this shows is that the topic of discussion, and the background knowledge that an agent has on that 
topic needs to be put in context. In cases where social systems of hierarchy and oppression are operative, 
background knowledge about a topic (by the privileged) seems to be insufficient epistemic reason to 
grant lesser credibility to an agent’s testimony. Something else needs to come into play. This is another 
case where social consideration have a direct influence on our markers of credibility. 
4.3.4. The Reputation of the Speaker’s Sources 
As with the first marker of credibility I considered (the speaker’s track record for saying true things), we 
also expect that the speaker gets their information from a credible source. For instance, I will be more 
likely to believe someone who tells me the time from a clock or from their mobile phone than I am to 
believe someone who looks at the position of the sun on a cloudy day and tells me the time. Or, if one 
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person tells me that Miss X is the president of America because they saw it on the news, and someone 
else tells me that they have a hunch that Mr T is the president of America, I am more likely to believe the 
first person than I am to believe the second person. In cases similar to this, I take it that we find it 
generally acceptable to grant higher credibility to agents with trustworthy sources than we grant to agents 
with questionable sources. 
The question then becomes: what sources count as credible sources and what sources do not?  To what 
extent should social considerations influence the credibility we give to sources?  
We might want to think that the credibility we grant to sources is or should be based purely on epistemic 
considerations, but it is not as straightforward as that. When we think of sources of information, we 
mainly think in empirical terms like an event or an agent’s testimony. However, sources of information 
can be far less obvious at times. For example, when asked, as a black person, why I feel that an experience 
was racist, it is not always the case that I can point to a definite reason why I feel that way. It could be a 
hunch, or it could be the discomfort I felt in that situation. A hunch and felt discomfort are not typical 
sources of information. In the case of the president of America above, I do not believe the person’s 
testimony on who the president is based on a hunch they had. Similarly, I will not believe the testimony 
of someone who tells me the precise temperature based on how discomforting the weather is to them. 
The difference between these two sorts of cases is social considerations. The difficulty I have in precisely 
articulating why I think an experience is racist is captured in some of the debates on hermeneutical 
injustice. The sort of difficulty I experience here is similar to the difficulty experienced by women before 
they had the lexicon of sexual harassment to make sense of the experiences they have with their male 
colleagues at work (Fricker 2007). What we have here is a situation where what counts as sufficient 
epistemic reason to grant lesser credibility to an agent’s testimony in one instance is not necessarily 
sufficient in another instance. 
The common theme running through all four markers of credibility I have considered is that the very 
considerations that might be seen as plausible in deciding the level of credibility that an agent deserves 
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can also be the source of epistemic injustice in other instances. When these sorts of cases are obvious, 
we can analyse the epistemic injustice in that scenario through some of the many varieties of epistemic 
injustice available in the literature. In instances like this, the epistemic injustice is reducible to the social 
injustice in that scenario. However, the seemingly plausible nature of these markers of credibility means 
that it is possible for the epistemic injustice they contain to go unnoticed. When they go unnoticed, they 
are accepted by all within an epistemic community and the fact that it is readily available to the dominantly 
situated in a way that it is not available to the marginally situated in those communities gets obscured. 
Let me explain this in further detail. 
Recall my discussion of Bailey’s (2017) argument for ‘privilege-preserving epistemic pushback’. This is ‘a 
variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider 
both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalised groups experience daily’ (Bailey 
2017: 876). This request for members of socially dominant groups to consider the lived experience of the 
other is difficult for them to entertain because it is a challenge to the already dominant epistemic 
framework, or as Bailey puts it, a threat to their ‘epistemic home-turf advantage’. This, like my epistemic 
home terrain, is the idea that members of socially dominant groups are used to operating in epistemic 
spaces where their perceptions go unchallenged (Bailey 2017: 877). These sorts of epistemic spaces are 
comfortable to members of the socially dominant groups because they readily possess the currency to 
interact in these spaces, and these sort of epistemic spaces preserves the privilege they have both 
epistemically and socially.  
Consider some of my examples above where statistics are used to dismiss the claim of the marginalised. 
This move is beneficial to the members of the socially dominant group because it helps them maintain 
their sense of innocence and comfort (Atkins 2019). At the same time, they can exercise the resilience of 
their epistemic system by pushing back against this uncomfortable idea. This is so nuanced that the 
pushback almost goes undetected. This lack of engagement with the lived experience of the oppressed 
leads to the creation of willful ignorance, and as Bailey puts it succinctly, ‘knowledge and ignorance are 
simultaneously produced and circulate[d] with equal vigor’ (Bailey 2017: 877). The variant of this 
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epistemic pushback that is at the centre of hegemonic injustice is the not necessarily conscious one that 
happens due to the acceptance of some ill-formed hegemonic intuitions by all within an epistemic 
community. 
When epistemic systems are formed in this oppressive way, it is dangerous not only to the victims of this 
oppression but to epistemology itself. If one of the central cognitive successes in epistemology is 
knowledge, then ignorance is a cognitive failure. At various points above, I have shown how the resilience 
of epistemic frameworks can be a bad thing in the way that it is oppressive to the socially marginalised. 
This oppression is so nuanced, and sometimes covert, that attending to the social issues through which 
these oppressions manifest themselves is simply not enough. For instance, changing racist laws at the 
social level might be beneficial in dealing with issues of unequal opportunities caused by racism. However, 
this does nothing to change the narrative about white supremacy that is embedded in our collective social 
understanding. These sorts of issues are intrinsically epistemic. As such, remedying social issues that are 
manifested instances of hegemonic injustice is not necessarily enough to remedy hegemonic injustice 
itself. 
So, what is the distinctly epistemic problem that arises from this? I argued in chapter two that this is a 
foundational epistemic problem. Let me recap. A foundational epistemic problem, in my usage, is an 
oppressive epistemic situation that arises from social situations of oppression that influences our 
epistemic systems in a way that is obscure, persistent, and thus, difficult to defeat. This takes Dotson’s 
(2018: 130) idea of ‘a problem with epistemology’ as its starting point. What I add to Dotson’s idea is an 
emphasis on the initially oppressive, and historically persistent structures that create these oppressive 
epistemic systems. The resistance against these sorts of oppressive systems is what most of the literature 
on epistemic injustice is about. However, there are instances where this domination faces no resistance. 
Rather, it is faced with an effort by the dominated to try to fit into the system of dominance. 
In cases like this, epistemic systems with this sort of foundational issues become breeding grounds for 
appreciative silencing and hegemonic injustice since they are, for the most part, impervious to meaningful 
resistance. This is because, with time, epistemic systems develop resilience to external influences that try 
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to disrupt it. So, if we have an epistemic system that is built on oppressive ideologies, and this system has 
developed over time, the hermeneutical and general epistemic resources available to this system makes it 
difficult for it to succumb to an external force. If that epistemic system is built on and influenced by 
oppressive social ideologies, we are stuck with a very resilient and oppressive epistemic system. When we 
have a highly resilient but oppressive epistemic system, it becomes difficult for the oppression of 
members of socially marginalised groups to be sensible according to the dictates of that epistemic system. 
This epistemic system becomes the shared norms and understanding that exists within a given society by 
which the society understands itself and is guided.  
As I have hopefully shown, in oppressive situations, these epistemic systems have a foundational 
epistemic problem. So, when an epistemic framework that has a foundational epistemic problem is 
resilient towards external forces that aim to change it, it does not only ensure its sustenance, but also the 
sustenance of that oppressive power structure. When an epistemic system with a foundational epistemic 
issue is resilient and becomes hegemonic, the oppression embedded in the epistemic system gets 
internalised by the oppressed. This ilk of internalised oppression that leads to an acceptance and 
normalisation of oppressive situations is what is responsible for appreciative silencing. Here, rather than 
create or stick to their ways, the oppressed are caught in a frantic drive to try to be like the ‘master’. In 
this drive to be like the ‘master’, members of oppressed groups form or adapt to a new epistemic system. 
This epistemic system in most cases is the epistemic system of the oppressor. One of the problems with 
this is that more often than not, these epistemic systems are of the nature that sustains the undue 
superiority of those it belongs to by creating the wrong kind of resilience against any idea that threatens 
it. An epistemic system like this has a foundational epistemic problem. This foundational epistemic 
problem is the reason why we cannot simply reduce instances of hegemonic injustice to instances of 
social oppression. It is a distinctly epistemic concern. 
4.4. The Change Required 
Dotson (2014) argues that the primary difference between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic 
exclusion is the change required to remedy them. For reducible forms of epistemic exclusion, the change 
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required can come from within the defaulting epistemic system. All it requires is for members within that 
epistemic system to abide by the dictates of their epistemic system. For third-order epistemic exclusion 
however, the problem ‘can only begin to be addressed through recognition of the limits of one’s overall 
epistemological frameworks’ (Dotson 2014: 116). I agree with Dotson’s general claim that the change 
required to attend to third-order phenomena (hegemonic injustice in this instance) needs to come from 
outside of the defaulting epistemic system. However, I do not agree with the particular claim that this is 
required because the defaulting epistemic system lacks the appropriate resources to make this change – 
at least in the case of hegemonic injustice. This is because in cases that eventually become third-order 
phenomena, it starts from an agent or group’s misuse of the available epistemic resources. This eventually 
compounds and becomes a part of the epistemic system in a way that is irreducible to the initial social 
phenomenon that causes it. 
My formulation of Dotson’s general claim is that the change required to remedy hegemonic injustice 
needs to come from outside the defaulting epistemic system – specifically from resistant epistemic 
systems. In cases where these are not available, an epistemic system or an aspect of the defaulting 
epistemic system that actively seeks epistemic justice should take precedence. This is for two simple 
reasons. The first is that resistant epistemic systems are formed out of a recognition of epistemic injustice 
and thus, they consciously think about epistemic justice. The second is that members of socially 
marginalised groups that form a resistant epistemology are privy to the oppressive epistemic system and 
their resistant epistemic system. Hence, they have a ‘double consciousness’ that is a source of greater 
epistemic wealth (Du Bois 1903). Let me develop a model of what this might look like. This model is not 
in any way meant to be definite, or objection-proof. What it aims to highlight are the key features that 
ought to be taken into account if we are to remedy hegemonic injustice. 
4.4.1. Fair-Minded Pursuit of Knowledge 
Fair-mindedness in the pursuit of knowledge here is an epistemic disposition in which an agent prioritises 
the need to be epistemically faithful and just in their epistemic practices. This epistemic disposition has 
two elements to it – faithfulness and justice. Being epistemically faithful entails valuing epistemic ends 
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over the advancement and sustenance of pernicious non-epistemic agendas. For example, if an epistemic 
agent has the option of either being faithful to furthering epistemic ends or furthering specific pernicious 
political agenda, the fair-minded agent will give priority to furthering epistemic ends. Being epistemically 
just entails privileging the virtues of epistemic justice over the vices of epistemic injustice. For example, 
if an epistemic agent is faced with the options to either suspend judgement to avoid testimonial injustice 
or proceed with judgment with high chances of testimonial injustice, the fair-minded agent will suspend 
judgment to avoid an instance of testimonial injustice. 
As I have mentioned at various points above, when ill-formed hegemonic intuitions that lead to 
appreciative silencing and hegemonic injustice are formed and sustained, this is not done solely out of 
the epistemic merits of holding such positions. Rather, social considerations come into play. They do so 
not in a way that recognises the situatedness of the agent (which would be good), but rather, in a pervasive 
way that seeks to sustain the position of social and epistemic privilege already held by a social group. This 
is the wrong kind of motivation that an epistemic agent ought to have in their epistemic lives. If an agent 
possesses the disposition of fair-mindedness in their pursuit of knowledge, they are motivated by 
epistemic ends, since fair-minded in this sense entails being faithful and just to epistemic, rather than 
pernicious social considerations. 
I understand the disposition of fair-mindedness here to be a cognitive character trait of an epistemic 
agent that orients them towards knowledge in a way that minimises error – both epistemically and 
ethically. What this means is that a fair-minded epistemic agent is one who prioritises at least two 
character traits in their epistemic lives. The first is that they prioritise epistemic goals over pernicious 
non-epistemic goals. The second is that when faced with a situation where their ‘normally’ epistemic 
instincts might be a cause of moral or epistemic wrongs and harms, they have the duty to re-evaluate 
their epistemic practices and adjust accordingly20. So, for example, imagine that I, a black man, complain 
 
20 This is one point that is made by the literature on moral and pragmatic encroachment and my analysis on the 
markers of credibility in the subsections of 4.3 has, hopefully made this point also. 
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about experiencing brutality from the police. If the uptake I get from a white person who hears this is 
guided by the prejudicial stereotype that black people always complain (falsely) about police brutality, 
then I have experienced epistemic injustice. However, if my listener listens to me with the disposition of 
fair-mindedness, they will seek to be epistemically faithful and just. This requires that they engage with 
me in a way that focuses on the epistemic merits of the claims I make. In contrast, when I am listened to 
and judged based on prejudicial stereotypes, pernicious non-epistemic considerations are at play.  
If the white person ‘ignores’ their prejudicial stereotypes about me and engages with me in a way that 
seems appropriate only to discredit my claim with legal injunctions and statistics, and I accept this 
paradigm for truth because it is hegemonic to me, this is an instance of hegemonic injustice. The harm I 
face here is evident in the epistemic home-turf advantage that the white person possesses through their 
unjustly formed, and now hegemonic epistemic framework. However, if they possess the disposition of 
fair-mindedness, the need to be epistemically faithful and just will make them aware of the vices in their 
current epistemic practice, but not that alone. They should also be aware of, and act against the vices that 
inform their entire epistemic framework. In this way, fair-mindedness can be seen as an intellectual virtue 
of sorts. Let me explain how this is the case with an adaptation of Jason Baehr’s (2016) ‘dimensions of 
intellectual virtues’. My explanation of the principles that Baehr proposes as dimensions of intellectual 
virtues can be understood as characteristic features of an epistemic agent with the disposition of fair-
mindedness. 
The first dimension is the affective principle. For the fair-minded agent, this means that they take pleasure 
(or experiences other appropriate affections) in being epistemically faithful and just. This requires that an 
agent not only possesses the disposition of fair-mindedness but also conceives of it as the appropriate 
disposition. It is important that the fair-minded agent conceives of it as the appropriate epistemic 
disposition because it helps to differentiate between instances of genuine epistemic engagements, and 
instances of epistemic pushback. (Recall Bailey’s (2017) analysis of privilege preserving epistemic 
pushback where epistemic pushback can be disguised as ‘critical reasoning’ or ‘healthy scepticism’.) 
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The second dimension is the competence principle. This requires that an agent be competent in the 
activities that are characteristic of fair-mindedness, that is, the agent needs to be competent in their ability 
to be epistemically fair and just in their pursuit of knowledge. This, intuitively, will be difficult for an 
epistemic agent that operates based on ill-formed hegemonic intuitions. This is because such intuitions 
are already influenced by prejudicial stereotypes that are neither faithful nor just to the fair-minded pursuit 
of knowledge. When an agent operates based on an epistemic framework that is intrinsically prejudicial, 
nothing in that framework readily gives them the resources to fight against that prejudice. So, there is a 
need to move outside of this prejudiced epistemic framework to find resources that have the potential to 
ensure fairness and justice in their epistemic pursuits. This feature further motivates my claim that 
remedying hegemonic injustice requires that an agent seeks out resources from an epistemic system other 
than the defaulting one. 
The third dimension is the judgement principle. This requires that an agent possesses the prudence to 
know when an activity that characterises fair-mindedness would be appropriate. It requires that an agent 
knows when to be faithful and just in their epistemic pursuit. This principle is valuable in different ways. 
One of which, touches on instances of the sort I have already highlighted when an agent allows their 
‘ignorance’ to be a tool for epistemic pushback. Recall the example of Black Lives Matter and the 
response of All Lives Matter. In instances like this, the anti-Black Lives Matter protester feigns ignorance 
by either outrightly taking the Black Lives Matter slogan to be exclusionary or asking that the slogan be 
explained properly to them. Actions like this show a lack of prudence in the epistemic agent to understand 
that protests like this are not simply about a slogan but are a way of highlighting graver instances of 
injustice. An agent with the disposition of fair-minded who aims for epistemic faithfulness and justice is 
well placed to know that societal injustices faced by members of marginalised groups are enough reason 
to take the epistemic merits of their claims about injustices seriously, rather than pushback against them. 
Another dimension of the judgment principle is that it requires an agent to know when to take the sort 
of moral and pragmatic considerations I discussed in the previous chapter on board. 
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I have proposed the disposition of fair-mindedness as a way to help mitigate instances of hegemonic 
injustice. What this disposition of fair-mindedness ensures in the epistemic agent is that they prioritise 
the need to be fair and just in their epistemic practice over the need to sustain a position of social 
advantage that they hold. Although I have hinted at a pragmatic dimension to the disposition of fair-
mindedness, its focus is primarily epistemic. This is warranted because the vice it aims to remedy – 
hegemonic injustice – is a distinctly epistemic one. But how is this the case? 
Let me answer with the aid of an analogy. Suppose I am fouled during a game of football and the referee 
awards me a freekick. The fundamental reason why the referee is awarding me the freekick is that my 
opponent has done something against the rules of the sport (football). While the foul committed against 
me (kicking my legs) might be accepted in other sports (kickboxing for example), it is not acceptable in 
football. Hence, the referee’s decision to award me a freekick is in keeping with the requirements of 
football specifically. Similarly, if hegemonic injustice is antithetical to the fair-minded pursuit of 
knowledge as I have hopefully shown, the imperative to remedy it is a distinctly epistemic one.  This 
claim, as is, requires some clarification. This is because as I have used a sporting analogy to support this 
claim, an alternate analogy can muddy the intuition behind my claim. For example, it may be that anything 
that contains noxious gas should be eliminated for moral reasons, but it does not follow that that things 
containing noxious gas are moral things21. The clarification that is needed is in the point that I have 
hopefully made in section 4.3 when I argued about the elements of hegemonic injustice that are 
irreducible to social oppression. One point this argument aims to show is that in instances of hegemonic 
injustice, there are distinctly epistemic wrongs that are irreducible to social oppression. If this works, then 
the need to remedy these distinctly epistemic wrongs are epistemic. If the epistemic wrongs in a scenario 
is reducible to social oppression, then we could have epistemic, as well as other relevant reasons (social 
or moral for example) to remedy that epistemic wrong. 
 
21 Thanks to Veli for this point and the example. 
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4.4.2. An Ubuntu Epistemic Approach22 
In this section, I use the concept of Ubuntu and other cognate concepts from societies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to develop a new epistemic perspective that hopefully shows how an epistemic agent can be fair-
minded in the way I have explained in the previous section. The concepts I consider are the concepts of 
Ubuntu and communitarianism. I do not claim that the core ideas of these concepts – in its particularities 
– are unique to and found within every society in Sub-Sahara Africa. Neither do I claim that the intuitions 
I put forward can be found within every society in Sub-Sahara Africa. My contention rather is that the 
concepts I put forward a) cover intuitions that can be found predominantly within most societies in Sub-
Saharan Africa and, b) provide a good tool in conceptualising an epistemic practice that could help 
remedy hegemonic injustice. Let me begin with the concept of Ubuntu before moving on to the concept 
of communitarianism. 
The first concept I consider – Ubuntu – premised on the aphorism umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (persons 
are persons through other persons) accounts for a way of life of sub-Saharan Africans as harmonious 
(Metz 2007: 338). This account suggests that an action is right to the extent that it maximises harmony 
and is wrong to the extent that it promotes discord (ibid.).   
Classic usage of this harmony account of Ubuntu has typically served two functions: the descriptive and 
the normative. The descriptive role concerns the lived moral norms of African communities within the 
Ubuntu paradigm. The normative role proposes moral theories that can be found within this paradigm 
and serve as a theory of right action. My application of Ubuntu transposes this ethical application to an 
epistemic one. I examine general considerations that are predominantly intuitive to societies within sub-
Saharan Africa. Based on these considerations, I point out the kind of knowledge formation process that 
is present within these kinds of societies (the descriptive dimension). In teasing out the knowledge 
formation process, I rely on the decision-making process found in these societies and how this process 
 
22 I have argued for this idea of an Ubuntu Epistemic Approach in my Honours essay in 2018. Parts of this section 
is taken from the arguments I made in my Honours paper. 
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is integral to their way of living. This move on my part helps to show the key elements that I consider to 
be crucial to remedying hegemonic injustice. The element here is the dialogical method of knowledge 
formation found within these societies (the normative dimension). 
One consideration characteristic of societies within the Ubuntu paradigm is that decisions are made 
consensually. The consensual decision-making process is facilitated by the form of democracy found 
traditionally within most African societies. These societies consist, in most cases, of a monarch and a 
council of Elders (that is representative of every group in the community) that has the duty of advising 
the monarch. This system of government is enabled by a need to live harmoniously and ensure a fair 
representation of all parties. The consensus practised in these Ubuntu-based paradigms is premised on 
the notion that knowledge is not monolithic. The practicalities of this system are shown in Edward 
Wamala’s (2004: 439 – 440) analysis of the traditional form of democracy found among the Ganda people 
where the monarch rules through a council of heads of clans that represented the various levels in the 
society.  
This represents a limited kind of monarchy where decision making is based on consensus. Wamala 
attributes the Gandas’ dedication to consensus to the ‘belief that knowledge is ultimately dialogical or 
social’ (Wamala 2004: 437). This dialogical conception of knowledge is also applied to the so-called 
experts in this society (blacksmiths, et cetera). Basically, knowledge formation in this society relies upon 
the interaction of perspectives. He highlights this in some of the proverbs within the oral literature of the 
Ganda people:  
‘Knowledge is like firewood in the hearth, if you have none you fetch it from your 
neighbor’, ‘I am wise, only if others have informed you’, ‘Belief in his intellectual self-
sufficiency resulted in Magambo’s failure to reach home. Magambo, a blind man, failed 




Beyond the Ganda people, this sort of consensual system can also be found amongst other societies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Joe Teffo (2004: 446) refers to consensus as ‘the hallmark of traditional political 
decision-making in many African communities’ in a system he refers to as ‘communocracy’.   
The second concept I consider is communitarianism. This idea has had different applications in African 
philosophy from the ontological (Ramose 2003), the ethical (Metz 2007, Ramose 2003), to the political 
(Gyeke 1997, Matolino 2014, Menkiti 1984). Central to all these uses, however, is that this communitarian 
attitude exudes the idea that the good of the individual and the community are aligned. With regards to 
knowledge formation, the venture of a communitarian based epistemic approach will be jointly inquisitive 
which is congenial to the disposition of fair-mindedness in the pursuit of knowledge. Polycarp Ikuenobe 
(2018: 23) explains communitarianism in the epistemic context as ‘the idea of mutual dependence and 
organic relationships between community and individuals, and among individuals’. Ikuenobe explains 
this communalism in the context of oral traditions within African societies and argues that the reliance 
on oral traditions in African societies is ‘based on the principles of epistemic trust, epistemic dependence, 
and epistemic communalism’ (ibid). 
Of these elements that Ikuenobe mentions as essential for communalism, let me focus on epistemic trust. 
Recall that I have mentioned Grasswick’s (2018) concept of ‘epistemic trust injustice’ in chapter 1. 
Epistemic trust injustice is a form of epistemic injustice which occurs when a community or agent fails 
to ‘satisfy the conditions of responsibly-placed trust’ put on them by others (Grasswick 2018: 83-84). 
While I have not said much on the connection between hegemonic injustice and epistemic trust, the 
catalyst for hegemonic injustice bears similarities to the catalyst for epistemic trust injustice. In instances 
of epistemic trust injustice, the members of socially marginalised groups fail to trust even when they 
should. The reason for their distrust is their historical experience of epistemic bad faith from members 
of socially dominant groups. That is, it is the experience of members of socially marginalised groups that 
members of socially dominant groups have not had their best interest at heart in their epistemic practices 
–  hence the distrust. I have, at this point, hopefully, shown that in cases of hegemonic injustice, members 
of socially dominant groups are pernicious in their epistemic practices and these epistemic practices 
98 
 
become hegemonic to the minds of members of socially marginalised groups. This is not in the best 
interest of members of socially marginalised groups.  
To the extent that communalism, in Ikuenobe’s construal is an epistemic system that is possible on the 
principles of epistemic trust, I believe that it holds great value in attending to an epistemic injustice that, 





In the preceding chapters, I have tried to answer this central question: how should we understand 
instances where the victims of epistemic bad practices are also victims of historical systems of self-
devaluation that make them perversely appreciative of the harms they face? This inquiry was motivated 
by a gap in the literature on epistemic injustice that fails to account for instances of epistemic injustice 
that lack the common and expected characteristics. Most of what the literature on epistemic injustice and 
its cognate phenomena contain is an analysis of how a person can be harmed in their capacity as an 
epistemic agent. A salient feature of these harms is that they involve silencing. When an agent is silenced, 
it elicits an emotional response of anger. This is an appropriate response that helps us recognise and track 
instances of these epistemic bad practices. 
However, I find these available analyses to be insufficient in capturing instances of epistemic injustice 
that do not elicit the emotional response of anger from its victims but the opposite response of 
appreciation. I have argued for a new form of epistemic injustice that makes sense of instances like this 
which I tagged hegemonic injustice. This is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when the oppressed in 
a given system accept the ill-formed hegemonic intuitions that oppress them. By ill-formed hegemonic 
intuitions, I mean those in-built standards of validation with which we judge what is properly epistemic 
within an epistemic system that is influenced by prejudicial stereotypes. 
Hegemonic injustice has the unique attribute where victims of these epistemic injustices become 
accomplices to their oppression in a process I called appreciative silencing. That is, a form of epistemic 
silencing where a) the perpetrator and victim rely on ill-formed hegemonic intuitions, b) the victim is 
neither resistant to the oppression they experience, nor do they recognise it as such, c) the victim 
appreciates the oppressive system. 
While forms of epistemic injustices might be manifestations of prior social injustices, they are not always 
reducible to them. Hegemonic injustice, more specifically, cannot be reduced to social injustices. This is 
because, in its unique nature, hegemonic injustice takes on a life of its own when its sustenance is no 
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longer dependent on social structures. Rather, it becomes the ideology that sustains these social 
structures. Take, for instance, a society that already holds white ideals to be superior to black ideals. Social 
change cannot stop these ideals from being what they are. At best, social change can help this society 
create a new way for itself that encompasses both the white and the black people under the umbrella of 
these white ideals. When faced with a situation like this, we might be fooled into thinking that everyone 
is treated equally and given equal opportunity at a societal level. In reality, what we have is a society that 
is tailormade for some, while it requires others to navigate its spaces delicately. When I say hegemonic 
injustice represents a distinct epistemic wrong that cannot simply be remedied by fixing outward societal 
issues, this is what I say it in reference to. The distinct epistemic problem is those ill-formed hegemonic 
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